Nonreligion, Atheism, & Mental Health

Abstract

Based on the well-established link between religiosity and positive mental health outcomes, it has been argued that nonreligiosity is a health liability. However, most of this research suffers from methodological problems that limit their generalizability to nonreligious populations, such as atheists and agnostics. In the current chapter, we draw attention to these methodological issues, and argue in favor of a richer conceptualization of nonreligion than has been theorized in previous literature. We further review recent work from various countries around the world, which challenges the notion that nonreligiosity presents a health risk, finding instead that the nonreligious experience similar levels of health and wellbeing benefits as the religious. We end by briefly discussing the limitations and recent backlash at this literature, while suggesting that the study of the nonreligious may transform how we understand the interaction between beliefs, rituals, and health.

A Complex Simplicity: The Relationship of Religiosity and Nonreligiosity to Life Satisfaction

“…The relationship between other nonreligious beliefs in addition to belief in science and progress and life satisfaction has not yet been researched. For example, Farias and Coleman (In press) discuss “Humanism, Positivism, Existentialism, Marxism, Transhumanism” (4) as other relevant nonreligious belief systems. Furthermore, Moore and Leach (2016) propose the relationship of the salience of an individual's ideological identity (i.e., how central belief or nonbelief is in a person's life) to life satisfaction as an aspect of interest for future research.…”

“…Nonreligious individuals are not differentiated from weakly religious individuals and are often functioning as a residual group (Farias and Coleman In press; Galen 2015; Hwang, Hammer, and Cragun 2011; Moore and Leach 2016; Pasquale 2012; Zuckerman, Galen, and Pasquale 2016). Additionally, there is no differentiation between types of nonreligious individuals (e.g., atheists, agnostics, indifferent individuals, etc.…”

“…For example, a convinced atheist probably has difficulty answering questions on the importance of God or religion in his or her life or on the certainty of his or her religious beliefs if he or she wants to indicate that it is a central aspect in his or her life not to believe in God or adhere to a religion and that he or she is certain of his or her nonbelief. Cragun, Hammer, and Nielsen (2015) call such questions that assume religiosity as the norm and are therefore difficult to answer out of a nonreligious perspective “one‐and‐a‐half barreled items.” This might be one reason why Ellison (1991) did not find any nonlinear effects in his study because a question on the certainty of religious belief is difficult to answer for nonreligious individuals. Nonreligious individuals are not differentiated from weakly religious individuals and are often functioning as a residual group (Farias and Coleman In press; Galen 2015; Hwang, Hammer, and Cragun 2011; Moore and Leach 2016; Pasquale 2012; Zuckerman, Galen, and Pasquale 2016). Additionally, there is no differentiation between types of nonreligious individuals (e.g., atheists, agnostics, indifferent individuals, etc.…”