Noncooperative multiagent game model for the electricity market on the basis of the renewable energy portfolio standard

Abstract

In China, after the revision of the renewable energy policy, transactions among the main parties involved in the electricity market are becoming increasingly complicated. Nevertheless, the impact of the Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS) on market equilibrium has not been studied so far. Hence, in this study, a noncooperative multiagent game model for the electricity market was developed on the basis of the recently released RPS and by considering various factors, such as green certificate transactions and the changing of the selling entities. The improved firefly algorithm was used to solve the model, and problematic gaming was analyzed empirically. Once the new RPS is implemented, the price of bound electricity will become higher than that of nonbound electricity, and the trading volume of bound electricity will increase. Because fossil energy producers will no longer be responsible for the electricity quotas, their electricity trading volumes will now be more related to the market demand than they were earlier. Renewable energy companies will increase their revenues by reducing their bound electricity sales. If the RPS increases the electricity quota ratios, the costs incurred by electricity sales companies and large power users will also increase, leading the electricity sales companies to reduce their electricity trading volumes. The study findings will help analyze the impacts of implementing the RPS and provide a basis and a reference for policymakers to make improvements to the standard in the future.