Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley–Shubik index

Laruelle, Annick; Valenciano, Federico

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.003

Cited by 51 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…This makes the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (hereafter, ANBS) a natural candidate for analyzing the river sharing problem. The ANBS has been axiomatized in e.g., Kalai (1977), Kaneko (1980) and Herrero (1989), and it is supported by strategic bargaining models in e.g., Herrero (1989), Miyakawa (2006), Laruelle and Valenciano (2008) and Herings and Predtetchinski (2010). Application of the ANBS to the river sharing problem with only two agents, an upstream and a downstream agent, can be found in e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem

Houba

Laan

Zeng

2014

SBE

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem

Houba

Laan

Zeng

2014

SBE

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“…In this paper, we are not interested in institution design as such but rather the consequences and, therefore, the SSI values are the ones that should be looked at. First, the SSI is more appropriate when one evaluates bargaining committees whereas NBI is more appropriate when the committee makes only take-it-orleave-it decisions (see Laruelle and Valenciano (2008). As the Council is certainly closer to a bargaining committee than to a take-it-or-leave-it committee and, therefore, we have chosen the SSI as the main tool.…”

Section: Internal Effect On CM Distribution Of Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making

Widgrén¹

2008

CESifo Economic Studies

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the design of voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are examined. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is that voting rules matter. This clearly explains why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations. The internal decisionmaking rules in the Council have substantial impact on both the national distribution of power in the Council and inter-institutional power between the EU's decision-making bodies. Terms of use: Documents inJEL codes: C70, D71, H77

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“…Myerson 1991;Sjöström 1991;Laruelle and Valenciano 2008;Britz et al 2010); or (iii) one player makes the first proposal, and in the continuation of the game, the rejecter of each proposal gets to propose in the next round.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution

2017

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This paper provides a non-cooperative foundation for (asymmetric generalizations of) the continuous Raiffa solution. Specifically, we consider a continuous-time variation of the classic Ståhl-Rubinstein bargaining model, in which there is a finite deadline that ends the negotiations, and in which each player's opportunity to make proposals is governed by a player-specific Poisson process, in that the rejecter of a proposal becomes proposer at the first next arrival of her process. Under the assumption that future payoffs are not discounted, it is shown that the expected payoffs players realize in subgame perfect equilibrium converge to the continuous Raiffa solution outcome as the deadline tends to infinity. The weights reflecting the asymmetries among the players correspond to the Poisson arrival rates of their respective proposal processes.

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Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley–Shubik index

Cited by 51 publications

References 27 publications

Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem

Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem

The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making

A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution

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