Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution

Taylor, George V.

doi:10.2307/1859237

Cited by 116 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Those who would have benefited most directly were the shareholders of the Caisse d'Escompte which would be transformed into the national bank. As argued by Doyle (1988) and Taylor (1967), contrary to Marxist interpretations of the French Revolution, where the new National Assembly represented a rising bourgeoisie, many of the deputies of the Third Estate, which was now dominant within the Assembly, were actually venal office-holders. 64 There were very few private bankers in the assembly, nor were bankers an important constituency for the deputies in general.…”

Section: Measuring French Government Credibilitymentioning

confidence: 92%

Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited

Stasavage

2002

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

188

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Section: Measuring French Government Credibilitymentioning

confidence: 92%

Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited

Stasavage

2002

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

188

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“…Furthermore, they despised the considerable risk exposure of merchants, merchant manufacturers and bankers whose sources of income were incompatible with the nobility status (Bluche, 1960). In fact, it has been widely acknowledged that French magistrates sacrificed capital for status (Taylor, 1967). Judicial respect for property rights also probably suffered because judgeships were often expropriated by kings who were free to sell new judicial offices (Doyle, 1996;Swart, 1980) and interfere with private property (North and Thomas, 1988;Pipes, 1999), hampering the secure development of property rights.…”

Section: The Conscious Design Of Modern Civil Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judges' Cognition and Market Order

Arruñada

Andonova

2008

Review of Law &Amp; Economics

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We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion in both legal traditions were thus adapted to different circumstances, mainly the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The long-term confluence of both branches of the Western legal system towards lesser freedom of contract is explained as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system. These favored the adoption of sharing solutions that interfered with market-supporting institutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders.

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“…It has been claimed that both the lack of practice and these doctrinal influences made Continental judges more resistant to capitalist wealth accumulation and hindered their understanding of market transactions. Market relationships, with their considerable exposure to risk and striving for profit, were hardly understood by a judiciary which derived most of its income and status from risk-free rents (Taylor, 1967). Judicial respect for property rights also probably suffered because judgeships were often expropriated by kings who were free to sell new judicial offices (Doyle, 1996;Swart, 1980).…”

Section: Continental Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking

Arruñada

Andonova

2004

SSRN Journal

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Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19 th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

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Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution

Cited by 116 publications

References 0 publications

Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited

Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited

Judges' Cognition and Market Order

Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking

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