Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations

Sigholm, Johan

doi:10.1515/jms-2016-0184

Cited by 46 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 20 publications

(15 reference statements)

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“…Increasing the size of the early flatter region corresponds to a greater barrier to entry, and our model correctly predicts long-term stable hegemony in this case. Finally, reducing the size of the region (a smaller exponent) means lowering the barriers to entry, for example, in cyberspace, where although the power of a nation state is not easy to come by, small actors can nonetheless have a large impact [27], and our model predicts much greater instability in this power-diffuse domain, in line with the expectations of some scholars [28].…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

Modelling Hegemonic Power Transition in Cyberspace

2018

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Cyberspace is the newest domain of conflict and cooperation between states. In cyberspace, as in all other domains, land, sea, air, and space, these interactions often lead to the emergence of hegemons which are characterised by their predominant influence over global world order and all other states. We examined the emergence and collapse of hegemons in a modelled cyberspace world through the notions of power transition and power diffusion. We used Repast Simphony to construct a simple agent-based model (ABM) of a system of states interacting both competitively and cooperatively in this world. Our simple model parsimoniously captures the character of the real international system of states through simple parameters of wealth and power determining the outcome of attack or cooperation amongst pairwise interacting states. We found hegemons of global world order emerged in cyberspace as they do in the other traditional domains from models with these few parameters. And we found that hegemons, contrary to traditional understanding, are not exceptional states but merely occupy the tail of a continuous distribution of power and lifetimes. We also found that hegemony in the system depends on two perhaps unexpected parameters: the difficulty of acquiring power as wealth increases and the amount of cooperation between states. And as a consequence, we argue that cyberspace, as a power-diffuse domain where cooperation is easier than elsewhere, is less suited to the kind of hegemony we see in the traditional domains of state interaction.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 85%

Modelling Hegemonic Power Transition in Cyberspace

2018

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“…Network warfare is quite close to cyber warfare. Cyber warfare includes cyber penetration, cyber manipulation and cyber robbery (Sigholm, 2013, p. 51, Lehto et al, 2017. Conley et al (2016) state that Non-physical Network Defence is defence against security, business, intelligence, political, contact and company networks that are guided, owned and funded by a foreign state, as well as opaque foreign state networks.…”

Section: Related Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although previous studies (Lehto et al, 2017, Nimmo, 2015, Pomerantsev, 2015, Sigholm, 2013, p. 51, Mäntylä, 2014, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, Armistead et al, 2004pp. 13-20, Schechtman, 1996 have shown that a great deal of components of defence strategies exist in societies' IE, qualitative research of the origins of components of defence strategies and how a society becomes aware of these is lacking.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Components of defence strategies in society’s information environment: a case study based on the grounded theory

Mustonen-Ollila

Lehto

Heikkonen

2020

Security and Defence Quarterly

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The goal of this study is to explore the components of defence strategies faced by society in its information environment, and how these strategies are interrelated. This qualitative in-depth case study applied past research and empirical evidence to identify the components of defence strategies in a society's information environment. The data collected was analysed using the Grounded Theory approach and a conceptual framework with the components of defence strategies and the relationships between these components was developed using the Grounded Theory. This study shows that the goal of politically and militarily hostile actors is to weaken society's information environment, and that their operations are coordinated and carried out over a long time period. The data validates past studies and reveals relationships between the components of defence strategies. These relationships increase confidence in the validity of these components and their relationships, and expand the emerging theory. First, the data and findings showed 16 interconnected components of defence strategies. Second, they showed that the political, military, societal, power, and personal goals of the hostile actors carrying out cyber operations and cyber attacks are to weaken society's information environment. Third, they revealed that cyber operations and cyber attacks against networks, information and infrastructures are coordinated operations, carried out over a long time period. Finally, it was revealed that the actors defending society's information environment must rapidly change their own components of defence strategies and use the newest tools and methods for these components in networks, infrastructures and social media.

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“…Examples of state threat actors are militaries, foreign intelligence services and state-sponsored hackers. Non-state threat actors include hacktivists, terrorists and jihadists, who often operate beyond legal jurisdictions [24]. Table 3 provides a comparative analysis of the associated geopolitical risk arising from related IoT threat incidents.…”

Section: B Geopolitical Issues and Adversariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

IoT Technological Development: Prospect and Implication for Cyberstability

Anawar¹,

Zakaria²,

Masu’d³

et al. 2019

ijacsa

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Failure to address the risk poses by future technological development could cause devastating damage to public trust in the technologies. Therefore, ascendant technologies such as artificial intelligence are the key components to provide solutions for new cybersecurity threats and strengthen the capabilities of the future technological developments. In effect, ability of the technologies to prevent and withstand a cyber-attack could become the new deterrence. This paper will provide gaps to guide the government, industry, and the research community in pursuing Internet of Things (IoT) technological development that may be in need of improvement. The contribution of this paper is as follows: First, a roadmap that outline security requirements and concerns of future technology and the significant of IoT technology in addressing the concerns. Second, an assessment that illustrates the expected and unexpected impact of future technology adoption and its significant geopolitical implication on potential impacted areas such as regulatory, legal, political, military, and intelligence.

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Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations

Cited by 46 publications

References 20 publications

Modelling Hegemonic Power Transition in Cyberspace

Modelling Hegemonic Power Transition in Cyberspace

Components of defence strategies in society’s information environment: a case study based on the grounded theory

IoT Technological Development: Prospect and Implication for Cyberstability

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