(Non)intervention in intra-state conflicts

Amegashie, J. Atsu; Kutsoati, Edward

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.05.001

Cited by 41 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…On the other hand, the result regarding between-group wealth asymmetries is in line with previous findings in the rent-seeking literaturethat is, the more homogeneous the contestants in a static rent-seeking model, the greater the aggregate rent-seeking efforts (Amegashie and Kutsoati, 2006;Baye et al, 1993;Che and Gale, 1998;Epstein and Nitzan, 2006;Fu, 2006;Katz and Tokatlidu, 1996;Szymanski and Valletti, 2005). Notably, how between-group wealth asymmetries affect rent-seeking efforts when groups compete for the allocation of a pure public good, and in a context in which group size is not neutral has not been studied in the literature.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods: Wealth and Group's Size Heterogeneity

Nupia

2013

Economics & Politics

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We study how between-group wealth and size asymmetries affect aggregate rentseeking efforts when two groups compete for the allocation of a pure public good. Unlike with previous analyses on between-group asymmetries, we measure the utility cost of rent-seeking in terms of the loss in private consumption an individual faces when contributing to this activity. Our main result is that fewer betweengroup asymmetries do not necessarily imply greater aggregate rent-seeking efforts. The result is at odds with the commonly held notion that the more homogeneous the contestants in a static rent-seeking model, the greater the aggregate rent-seeking efforts. 1 Cheikbossian (2008) studies group size asymmetries in a context in which the magnitude of the public rents being allocated in the contest is not fixed, but changes with group size. Thus, in Cheikbossian's model group size affects rent-seeking efforts not only through the relative influence of each group but also through the size of the rents being contested. Actually, this feature of the public rents drives the results in his model. Unlike this study, and in the line of Katz et al. (1990) and Riaz et al. (1995), we consider a contest for a unique "pure" public good, which "rents" are constant for each group. Thus, as we will see, the channel through which group size affect aggregate rent-seeking in our framework is totally different to that considered by Cheikbossian (2008).

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods: Wealth and Group's Size Heterogeneity

Nupia

2013

Economics & Politics

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“…This is of course an economic measure, and not a military one. Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007) actually allow the third party (in one part of the paper) to intervene as a combatant. It chooses its level of effort at the same time as the belligerents choose theirs.…”

Section: Third-party Intervention: Conflict As Rent-seekingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peacekeeping: A strategic approach

Blouin¹

2018

Canadian J of Economics

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This paper presents a theoretical model of conflict between two players, with intervention by a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers are treated as a military contingent, capable of taking sides, acting as a third (independent) side in the war or remaining inactive, depending on circumstances. This departs from previous models, in which peacekeeping was no more than a parameter affecting players' fighting costs. The main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peacekeepers, detailing the nature and level of intervention required under different circumstances; this strategy results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The credible threat of force (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key component.

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“…We thank Editor Myrna Wooders, an anonymous Associate Editor, and reviewers for helpful comments. Grossman 2000 ;Gershenson 2002;Siqueira 2003;Amegashie and Kutsoati 2007;Chang and Sanders 2009). Other models consider a fixed amount of the conflict prize as being destroyed in conflict (i.e., exogenous destruction).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Third-party intervention has received significant focus within both the theoretical and empirical conflict literature. On the theoretical side, the literature includes models that characterize third-party effectiveness (see, e.g., Gershenson 2002;Siqueira 2003) and ones that endogenize third-party intervention (see e.g., Amegashie and Kutsoati 2007;Chang and Sanders 2009) to determine third-party effect upon conflict intensity and outcome. Studies in both sets largely consider the effectiveness and effect of third-party intervention upon conflict intensity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Within Gershenson's standard contest framework, however, sufficiently weak sanctions do not have the intended consequence. Another notable exception is a work by Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007) that describes the actions of a social planning third party to conflict. Rather than assume that peace is ideal, the third party influences conflict to maximize a weighted sum of utilities for the parties to conflict and the noncombatant population.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Endogenous Destruction in a Model of Armed Conflict: Implications for Conflict Intensity, Welfare, and Third‐Party Intervention

Sanders

Walia

2014

J Public Economic Theory

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This paper employs a contest approach to study a class of territorial conflicts in which conflict‐related arming is (endogenously) destructive of the contest prize. Of particular focus is the effect of endogenously destructive conflict arming upon conflict intensity and utility levels among primary parties to conflict. Also of interest are implications of endogenous destruction upon third‐party welfare effect in conflict. As compared to the case of a fixed‐prize conflict, we find starkly different arming and welfare outcomes in the case of an endogenously destructive conflict. We also find stark differences in third‐party effect under this distinct setting.

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(Non)intervention in intra-state conflicts

Cited by 41 publications

References 20 publications

Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods: Wealth and Group's Size Heterogeneity

Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods: Wealth and Group's Size Heterogeneity

Peacekeeping: A strategic approach

Endogenous Destruction in a Model of Armed Conflict: Implications for Conflict Intensity, Welfare, and Third‐Party Intervention

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