2021
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12566
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Non‐generally accepted accounting principles disclosures and audit committee chairs’ external directorships

Abstract: I examine the relation between the quality of non‐generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings disclosures and the number of external directorships held by a firm's independent audit committee chair (ACC). I find that firms with ACCs holding more external directorships provide higher quality non‐GAAP disclosures than those who do not hold outside board positions. When the ACC has at least one external directorship, the firm's non‐GAAP exclusions are more transitory, indicating that they are of high… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“… 2014 ). For example, in a recent study, Lee ( 2021 ) finds evidence that companies where the chair of the independent audit committee holds more external directorships have stronger monitoring and thus provide higher quality NGFM disclosures.…”
Section: Results: Insights and Critiquementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“… 2014 ). For example, in a recent study, Lee ( 2021 ) finds evidence that companies where the chair of the independent audit committee holds more external directorships have stronger monitoring and thus provide higher quality NGFM disclosures.…”
Section: Results: Insights and Critiquementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Studies on this determinant seem to support the proposition that companies with weak corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., less board independence) are more likely to optimistically report APMs, suggesting that strong corporate governance protects investors from misleading APM disclosures (e.g., Jennings and Marques 2011;Seetharaman et al 2014). For example, in a recent study, Lee (2021) finds evidence that companies where the chair of the independent audit committee holds more external directorships have stronger monitoring and thus provide higher quality NGFM disclosures.…”
Section: (Ii) Motives For the Reporting Of Apmsmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…This creates an incentive for directors to protect the firm reputation and, thus, to protect their own as well (Fredriksson et al , 2020). High-status chairs face considerable risk of image and reputation damage if misreports or fraud occur (Lee, 2022). We expect high-status chairpersons to be particularly eager to preserve their reputational capital and to be regarded as effective monitors of management.…”
Section: Literature Review and Development Of Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…, 2011; Jennings and Marques, 2011), accounting expertise of audit committee members (Seetharaman et al. , 2014), number of directorships the audit committee chair holds (Lee, 2021), and level of institutional ownership (Jennings and Marques, 2011), are effective in improving the quality of non-GAAP disclosures. External factors, such as analyst coverage (Christensen et al.…”
Section: Emerging Research Themesmentioning
confidence: 99%