Non-Cooperative Stability Definitions for Strategic Analysis of Generic Water Resources Conflicts

Madani, Kaveh; Hipel, Keith W.

doi:10.1007/s11269-011-9783-4

Cited by 130 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 74 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Using the types of modeling methods discussed in this chapter can potentially inform the debates that occur in these meetings. In addition, the application of game theory may be helpful in reaching a consensus among stakeholders having different objectives and desires (Madani 2010;Madani and Hipel 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance Criteria

Loucks

Beek

2017

Water Resource Systems Planning and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance Criteria

Loucks

Beek

2017

Water Resource Systems Planning and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Non-cooperative game theoretic methods are useful in studying the strategic behaviors of riparian parties, feasibility of cooperative solutions, and providing strategic insights into the conflicts (Madani and Hipel, 2011;Madani, 2013). Example transboundary river conflicts analyzed by non-cooperative game theory concepts include the conflict over flooding of Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers between India and Pakistan (Rogers, 1969), the lower Mekong river basin conflict between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam (Dufournaud, 1982), the Jordan river conflict between Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria (Madani and Hipel, 2007), and the Nile river conflict between Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (Elimam et al, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Example transboundary river conflicts analyzed by non-cooperative game theory concepts include the conflict over flooding of Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers between India and Pakistan (Rogers, 1969), the lower Mekong river basin conflict between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam (Dufournaud, 1982), the Jordan river conflict between Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria (Madani and Hipel, 2007), and the Nile river conflict between Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (Elimam et al, 2008). These methods normally rely on qualitative information to find the likely outcomes of conflicts based on various stability definitions, which incorporate a range of decision makers' (players') characteristics such as risk attitude, foresight level, and information quality (Madani and Hipel, 2011;Madani, 2013). While these methods provide valuable insights into strategic conflicts and can help find possible resolutions to the conflict, their results are not necessarily quantitative and in most cases are only appropriate for studying as games with discrete solutions (strategies or actions).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new framework for resolving conflicts over transboundary rivers using bankruptcy methods

Madani

Zarezadeh

Morid

2014

Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract.A novel bankruptcy approach is proposed for resolving transboundary river conflicts in which the total water demand or claim of the riparian parties is more than the available water. Bankruptcy solution methods can allocate the available water to the conflicting parties with respect to their claims. Four commonly used bankruptcy methods in the economic literature are used here to develop new river bankruptcy solution methods for allocating water to the riparian parties of river systems. Given the non-uniform spatial and temporal distribution of water across river basins, the proposed solution methods are formulated as non-linear network flow optimization models to allocate water with respect to time sensitivity of water deliveries at different locations in a river network during the planning horizon. Once allocation optimization solutions are developed, their acceptability and stability must be evaluated. Thus, a new bankruptcy allocation stability index (BASI) is developed for evaluating the acceptability of river bankruptcy solutions. To show how the proposed river bankruptcy framework can be helpful in practice, the suggested methods are applied to a real-world transboundary river system with eight riparians under various hydrologic regimes. Stability analysis based on the proposed stability evaluation method suggests that the acceptability of allocation rules is sensitive to hydrologic conditions and demand values. This finding has an important policy implication suggesting that fixed allocation rules and treaties may not be reliable for securing cooperation over transboundary water resources as they are vulnerable to changing socioeconomic and climatic conditions as well as hydrologic nonstationarity.

show abstract

“…Generally, both classes of uncertainty 135 analysis methods (i.e. sensitivity analysis and fuzzy MCDA) provide deterministic outputs that 136 might obscure useful information from decision makers (Madani & Lund, 2011 (Madani & Hipel, 2011;Madani, 2013) for group decision-making problems with 154 medium, low, and no cooperation among the decision making agents (Madani et al, 2014a). 155…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Stakeholder-driven multi-attribute analysis for energy project selection under uncertainty

Read

Madani

Mokhtari

et al. 2017

Energy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

48In practice, selecting an energy project for development requires balancing criteria and 49 competing stakeholder priorities to identify the best alternative. Energy source selection can be 50 modeled as multi-criteria decision-maker problems to provide quantitative support to reconcile 51 technical, economic, environmental, social, and political factors with respect to the stakeholders' 52 interests. Decision making among these complex interactions should also account for the 53 uncertainty present in the input data. In response, this work develops a stochastic decision 54 analysis framework to evaluate alternatives by involving stakeholders to identify both 55 quantitative and qualitative selection criteria and performance metrics which carry uncertainties. 56The developed framework is illustrated using a case study from Fairbanks, Alaska, where 57 decision makers and residents must decide on a new source of energy for heating and electricity. 58We approach this problem in a five step methodology: (1) engaging experts (role players) to 59 develop criteria of project performance; (2) collecting a range of quantitative and qualitative 60 input information to determine the performance of each proposed solution according to the 61 selected criteria; (3) performing a Monte-Carlo analysis to capture uncertainties given in the 62 inputs; (4) applying multi-criteria decision-making, social choice (voting), and fallback 63 bargaining methods to account for three different levels of cooperation among the stakeholders; 64 and (5) computing an aggregate performance index (API) score for each alternative based on its 65 performance across criteria and cooperation levels. API scores communicate relative 66 performance between alternatives. In this way, our methodology maps uncertainty from the input 67 data to reflect risk in the decision and incorporates varying degrees of cooperation into the 68 analysis to identify an optimal and practical alternative. 69 70 3

show abstract

Non-Cooperative Stability Definitions for Strategic Analysis of Generic Water Resources Conflicts

Cited by 130 publications

References 74 publications

Performance Criteria

Performance Criteria

A new framework for resolving conflicts over transboundary rivers using bankruptcy methods

Stakeholder-driven multi-attribute analysis for energy project selection under uncertainty

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About