“…Example transboundary river conflicts analyzed by non-cooperative game theory concepts include the conflict over flooding of Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers between India and Pakistan (Rogers, 1969), the lower Mekong river basin conflict between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam (Dufournaud, 1982), the Jordan river conflict between Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria (Madani and Hipel, 2007), and the Nile river conflict between Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (Elimam et al, 2008). These methods normally rely on qualitative information to find the likely outcomes of conflicts based on various stability definitions, which incorporate a range of decision makers' (players') characteristics such as risk attitude, foresight level, and information quality (Madani and Hipel, 2011;Madani, 2013). While these methods provide valuable insights into strategic conflicts and can help find possible resolutions to the conflict, their results are not necessarily quantitative and in most cases are only appropriate for studying as games with discrete solutions (strategies or actions).…”