Non-Cooperative Spectrum Access — The Dedicated vs. Free Spectrum Choice

Jagannathan, Krishna; Menache, Ishai; Modiano, Eytan; Zussman, Gil

doi:10.1109/jsac.2012.121217

Cited by 63 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…is the path loss in dB between the S-MS Tx and the P-MS Tx . The non-cooperative spectrum access technique is used with the energy detection spectrum sensing [7].The study has been conducted for the Global System for Mobile Communication, considering two channels with channel spacing 200 kHz to study the effect of detection threshold on interference at primary user receiver or victim receiver by single secondary user and to study the impact of increasing the number of secondary users or WSD on a primary user. Figure 3 shows the flowchart for the process of calculation of interference.…”

Section: Input Signal X(t)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparatative Analysis of Energy Detection Spectrum Sensing of Cognitive Radio Under Wireless Environment Using SEAMCAT

Kang¹,

Vig²,

Singh³

et al. 2016

ijacsa

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Abstract-In the recent years, the Cognitive Radio technology imposed itself as a good solution to enhance the utilization of unused spectrum and globalized the radio environment for different band users that utilize or require different techniques for transmission. In this paper, the energy detection spectrum sensing technique that is used to detect the presence of unknown deterministic signal is studied under the non-time dispersive fading environment using the Hata propagation model for picocell communication systems. The different aspects of nontime dispersive fading regions over energy detection spectrum sensing and impact of changing a detection threshold of the secondary user Cognitive Radio on interference at primary user for non-cooperative spectrum access have been studied in the terms of probability of interference. The entire Comparatative Analysis of Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive radio has been carried out with the aid of SEAMCAT software platform.

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Section: Input Signal X(t)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparatative Analysis of Energy Detection Spectrum Sensing of Cognitive Radio Under Wireless Environment Using SEAMCAT

Kang¹,

Vig²,

Singh³

et al. 2016

ijacsa

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For instance, the work in [22] analyzes the outcome of a game-theoretic pricing competition between providers in private commons. In the works by Jagannathan et al [23], Kasbekar and Sarkar [24], Duan et al [25], Niyato and Hossain [26], Sengupta and Chatterjee [27] and Xing et al [28], game theoretic approaches to spectrum auctioning and leasing are analyzed. None of the previous work surveyed here considers the impact of spectrum reservation for smaller providers on the competitiveness of a wireless market.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Network dimensioning with carrier aggregation

Kavurmacioglu

Starobinski

2015

2015 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN)

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Abstract-A recent policy ruling by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) set aside a fixed amount of cleared spectrum for smaller network providers. Thanks to this ruling, smaller providers can improve their quality of service using carrier aggregation. In this paper, we determine the optimal (minimum) level of carrier aggregation that a smaller provider needs in order to bring its service in line with a larger provider in the same market. Toward this end, we provide an asymptotically exact formula for the loss (blocking) probability of flows under a quality-driven (QD) regime. Using this formula, we establish an efficient way of numerically calculating the optimal level of carrier aggregation and derive scaling laws. Specifically, we show that the optimal level of carrier aggregation scales sub-linearly with respect to the scaling factor, i.e., the ratio between the network capacities of the two providers, and decreases with the initial traffic load of the providers. We derive a closed-form linear upper bound on the optimal level of carrier aggregation and prove that it is the tightest possible. We provide numerical results, showing the accuracy of our methods and illustrating their use. We also discuss the extension of our results to delayrelated metrics as well as their application to profitable pricing in secondary spectrum markets.

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“…For instance, in the works by Jagannathan [16], Kasbekar [19], Duan [12], Ren [35], Niyato and Hossain [31], Sengupta and Chatterjee [37] and Xing [40], game theoretic approaches to spectrum auctioning and leasing are analyzed. The set-up of all these papers (i.e., competition between providers to lease spectrum) is different from ours (i.e., competition between providers to lure users).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition in secondary spectrum markets: Price war or market sharing?

Kavurmacioglu

Alanyali

Starobinski

2012

2012 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

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Abstract-Recent initiatives allow cellular providers to offer spot service of their licensed spectrum, paving the way to dynamic secondary spectrum markets. This paper characterizes market outcomes when multiple providers are drawn into competition for secondary demand. We study a game-theoretic model in which each provider aims to enhance its revenue by opportunistically serving secondary demand, while also serving dedicated primary demand. The secondary demand is a function of the price being charged. We consider two philosophies for sharing spectrum between primary and secondary demand: In coordinated access, spectrum providers have the option to decline a secondary access request if that helps enhance their revenue. We explicitly characterize a break-even price such that profitability of secondary access provision is guaranteed if secondary access is priced above the breakeven price, regardless of the volume of secondary demand. Consequently, we establish that competition among providers that employ coordinated access leads to a price war. In particular market sharing above the break-even price is not an equilibrium outcome. This conclusion is valid for arbitrary secondary-demand functions. While the demand function does not play a part in determining the winner, it does affect the price of secondary access as exercised by the winning provider. In uncoordinated access, primary and secondary users share spectrum on equal basis, akin to the sharing modality of ISM bands. We demonstrate that market equilibrium in an uncoordinated access setting can be fundamentally different as it opens up the possibility of providers sharing the market at higher prices.

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Non-Cooperative Spectrum Access — The Dedicated vs. Free Spectrum Choice

Cited by 63 publications

References 35 publications

Comparatative Analysis of Energy Detection Spectrum Sensing of Cognitive Radio Under Wireless Environment Using SEAMCAT

Comparatative Analysis of Energy Detection Spectrum Sensing of Cognitive Radio Under Wireless Environment Using SEAMCAT

Network dimensioning with carrier aggregation

Competition in secondary spectrum markets: Price war or market sharing?

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