Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology

Oliveira, Luis R. G.

doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.1001415

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…I won't pursue that line of argument here, but see Perrine (forthcoming) for a recent discussion of the doxastic puzzle and matters of responsibility. 17 I have argued elsewhere against versions of evidentialism stated in terms of prescriptive ought-claims (Oliveira 2017(Oliveira , 2018a, and against internalist notions of justification stated in agential terms (Oliveira 2015(Oliveira , 2018b).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Oliveira¹

2020

Epistemic Duties

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Oliveira¹

2020

Epistemic Duties

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“…Alston 1989, 10-11;1991, 149-153). 40 In Oliveira (2015), I resisted an argument against the basing requirement on justification (found in Silva 2015), by drawing an agential contrast between the epistemic and moral domain and by articulating a notion of "non-agential permissibility" that made the norms of epistemic evaluation more like the norms for evaluating clocks than the norms for evaluating actions. I take the present paper to be a development of that central notion and a correction of some claims I made in its defense.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification1

Oliveira¹

2022

Propositional and Doxastic Justification

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My starting point is what we can call the Normative Authority Conception of justification, where S is justified in their belief that p at t (to some degree n) if and only if their believing that p at t is not ruled out by epistemic norms that have normative authority over S at t. With this in mind, this paper develops an account of doxastic justification by first developing an account of the normative authority of epistemic norms. Drawing from work in political philosophy, I argue that (a) the cognitive and evaluative commitments and concerns behind our actual practices of holding each other and ourselves accountable for our beliefs reveal which epistemic norms we have consented to be under, and that (b) it is because we have consented to be under the authority of these norms -by actually holding ourselves and others accountable to them -that they in turn have normative authority over us. By connecting the authority of epistemic norms to the authority we have over ourselves in this way, the resulting account of doxastic justification (i) explains why it can be appropriate to criticize, resent, or sanction someone for having unjustified beliefs, (ii) avoids the phenomena of normative alienation and normative parochialism, and (iii) respects the social and collective nature of epistemic justification.

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“…I won't pursue that line of argument here, but see Perrine (forthcoming) for a recent discussion of the doxastic puzzle and matters of responsibility. I have argued elsewhere against versions of evidentialism stated in terms of prescriptive ought-claims (Oliveira 2017(Oliveira , 2018a, and against internalist notions of justification stated in agential terms (Oliveira 2015(Oliveira , 2018b.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Duties

McCain¹,

Stapleford²

2020

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There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.

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Non-Agential Permissibility In Epistemology

Cited by 11 publications

References 11 publications

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification1

Epistemic Duties

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