Nobility and Necessity: The Problem of Courage in Aristotle’s

Abstract

LEE WARD Kenyon CollegeI n the current debate over the status of moral virtue in ethical and political theory, Aristotle is an imposing and controversial figure. Both champions and critics of the ancient conception of virtue identify Aristotle as its most important proponent, but commentators often obscure the complexity of his treatment of moral virtue. His account of courage reveals this complexity. Aristotle believes that courage, and indeed virtue generally, must be understood as both an end in itself and a means to a more comprehensive good. In this way Aristotle's political science offers a middle course that corrects and embraces the claims of nobility and necessity in political life. Honor is central to this political science. It acts as a bridge between the desires of the individual and the needs of the political community and reduces the dangers posed by the excessive pursuit of nobility and the complete acquiescence to necessity.

When Toleration Becomes a Vice: Naming Aristotle's Third Unnamed Virtue

“…Several scholars have noted that the nameless virtues all pertain to social relations (Allen 2004;Curzer 2012;Gottlieb 2009;Lombardini 2013). Although it has been argued that other moral virtues are social (Avramenko 2011;Ward 2001), the nameless virtues are necessarily bound to our interactions with others. In other words, these nameless virtues speak to our habits of behavior in face-to-face encounters.…”

Moral Virtue and the Limits of the Political Community in Aristotle'sNicomachean Ethics

“…By contrast, as human beings, we live in community with others, and our perfection must therefore also take account of justice—as a matter of moral or right action, and not simply, as current students of Aristotle emphasize, of our happiness or flourishing (cf. Smith 2001, 153, 211–16, 225–29; Howland 2002, 50–53; Ward 2001, 80–82). Aristotle indicates that even in the case of less than perfect regimes, the weight of law and the importance of the common good are such that some consideration of justice must be made (1128b21–26, 1129b11–19, 1134a24–32; Pol .…”

“…6 6 Recent commentators have been critical of the noble as it is presented in the account of courage, either as encouraging a dangerous “illusion of self‐sufficiency” (Ward 2001, 78–80), or as involving an excessive attachment to manliness and honor (Smith 2001, 85–91). Howland (2002, 30) suggests that the “love of the noble” is philosophic, a suggestion he does not elucidate. …”

Courage in the workplace: The effects of organizational level and gender on the relationship between behavioral courage and job performance

“…Plato perceived courage as one of the four core virtues (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005). For Aristotle, courage was ‘inseparable from the human capacity for the deliberation and choice required for moral responsibility’ (Ward, 2001: 71). More recently, courage has been recognized as pivotal to workplace-related outcomes, such as creativity (May, 1975), and has been claimed to be ‘at the heart of leadership’ (Staub, 1996: 191).…”