No supply without demand: explaining the absence of the EU Battlegroups in Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic

Abstract

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Liberal Power Europe

“…In addition to the interests and ideas that define the preferences of groups, the institutions and decision‐making rules that translate these preferences into policy play a crucial role. In the case of security and defence policy, the intergovernmental nature and unanimity requirement make the EU rather reluctant to use force, as the non‐deployment of its battlegroups illustrates (Dembinski et al ., ; Reykers, ).…”

EU Battlegroups: High costs, no benefits

“…Throughout the past decade, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the Battlegroups' empty track record, discussing the EU's failure to deploy them to, among others, the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006and 2008, Chad in 2007, Libya in 2011, Mali in 2013, and the CAR in 2013(Balossi-Restelli, 2011Gowan, 2009Gowan, , 2011Jacoby & Jones, 2008;Pohl, 2014;Reykers, 2016b;Tardy, 2014Tardy, , 2015. They have identified a growing list of obstacles to deployment, including the flawed funding principle, national financial constraints, the lack of an EU permanent military headquarters, the Battlegroups seemingly not being fit for purpose, the limitation in size or deployment time, the EU's unanimity requirement, divergent member state perceptions on the use of force, and anti-EU sentiments usually in reference to the United Kingdom (Balossi-Restelli, 2011;Barcikowska, 2013;Brosig, 2010;Chappell, 2009Chappell, , 2012Curran & Williams, 2016;Gowan, 2009Gowan, , 2011Granholm & Jonson, 2006;Hardt, 2009).…”

“…Similar financial considerations also more recently hindered deployment. Reykers (2016b), for instance, shows that both the Dutch reluctance toward a potential deployment of a Battlegroup to Libya in 2011 and the Greek foot-dragging regarding the Greece-Bulgaria-Romania-Cyprus Battlegroup deployment to the CAR in 2014 were strongly inspired by these perceived financial costs. The German and Greek experiences also illustrated that these financial considerations are inherently connected to political considerations.…”

“…2013; Chappell, 2009Chappell, , 2012Gowan, 2009;Jacoby & Jones, 2008;Reykers, 2016b). Yet in the many reflections upon the EU Global Strategy, they are hardly mentioned.…”

European unity during the civil war in Libya (2015-2020)

“…Фокусом работы являются российские интересы и последствия саммита для Москвы. Й. Рейкерс [12], используя рационально-институционалистский подход, попытался объяснить отсутствие боевых групп ЕС в ливийском кризисе (2011 г.). В исследовании Л. Марчи [10] анализируются проблемы реакции ЕС и неиспользования механизмов Единой оборонной политики и политики безопасности (CSFP) для предотвращения акций насилия со стороны М. Каддафи против оппозиции.…”