No peace without injustice: Hobbes and Locke on the ethics of peacemaking

Abstract

<jats:p>Is the demand for justice likelier to cause or to prevent war? Hobbes expresses sympathy for the former view and Locke for the latter. However, they both reason their way toward an intermediate position, symbolized by the impartial judge in Locke's theory and the arbitrator in Hobbes's theory. Peace is possible when we create a process that resolves disputes according to widely intuitive principles of equality and reciprocity. This requires, however, that we refrain from imposing our particular interpretations of justice, and that we tolerate the possibility of unjust outcomes. Hobbes and Locke's reasoning shows us why international institutions are needed to serve as an impartial judge for the resolution of civil and international conflicts. They rebut persistent skepticism about the fitness of international institutions to promote peace and justice. Recent scholarship on ethno-political conflict confirms the wisdom of their analysis.</jats:p>

Utility contra utilitarianism: Holbach’s international ethics

“…This can only be done if there exists a power to constrain sovereign to act in a just manner, and this can be achieved through a tribunal to settle disputes. As Meyerfeld (2012: 290) has shown, a similar conclusion can come from a reading of Hobbes and Locke, as they demand an impartial arbitrator or judge for interstate conflict. Bentham will advocate for a very similar organ when he defends a common tribunal to apply moral sanctions to state action (Hoogensen, 2005: 86).…”

Realist climate ethics: Promoting climate ambition within the Classical Realist tradition

“…64 'Justice' is thus problematic internationally as there is no sovereign. 65 Classical Realists resist claims of a potential harmony of interests among states and eschew 'demonological interpretations' of international politics, as they anticipate that negotiation over conflicting 'interests' will be more respectful of pluralism if it is free of sanctimony. 66 Mindful that rejection of ideal standards can easily collapse into amoral realpolitik, Morgenthau outlines several ethical tenets: first, since there can be no international ethical consensus, Realism holds prudence, 'considering the consequences of seemingly moral action', as 'the supreme virtue in politics'.…”

The case for the international governance of immigration

“…If a group is confronting a morally risky decision and this group has biases that impair its capacity to make this decision in a reliable way, then the members of this group have strong moral reasons to delegate decision-making authority to more reliable institutions. Mayerfield (2012, 288–95) develops an argument along these lines for international institutions. States are often biased in favor of their own interests and can be blinded by nationalist pride.…”

“…Mayerfield observes: ‘If one group finds itself in conflict with another, members of the group form their views in consultation with fellow-members; they are little inclined to test those views against the objections from the other group. Under such circumstances, there is dangerously little check on the forces of bias and self-praise’ (2012, 289). These biases can lead states to engage in violent disputes and treat outsiders unjustly.…”