No pay, no peace: political settlement and post-amnesty violence in the Niger Delta, Nigeria

Abstract

The peace accord between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Niger Delta (ND) militants, within the framework of the 2009 amnesty programme, immediately yielded positive results. Daily oil production, which had drastically declined to an all time low of 1.4 million barrels, soon shot up to 2.2 million barrels as the deal restored relative calm in the region. In recent times, however, the seeming peace in the region has disappeared, to the consternation of those who had touted a DDR approach to the conflict in Nigeria's oil 'republic'. Kidnapping, for ransom in the region, shifted from high profile abduction to anyone in society that can offer a price. More than any other explanation, this article locates the resurgence of violence in the region in the fault lines of the DDR programme implemented in 2009. The author contends that the deal was a 'cash for peace' programme cloaked in 'amnesty'; which has inadvertently created a violence appeal for those who seek a slice of the so-called 'national cake'.

Peacebuilding and transformational change in Nigeria's oil region

“…Underlying the Niger Delta DDR Program is the state's use of monetary incentives to negotiate peace with the insurgents and to create an environment conducive to oil production (Agbiboa, ; Ajayi & Adesote, ; Davidheiser & Nyiayaana, ; Eke, ; Obi, ; B. Okonofua, ; Schultze‐Kraft, ; Ushie, ). Because the state was under pressure to increase its oil output, it presented the peace program as “renegotiation of the prevailing political settlement geared at protecting the economic and political interests of powerful elites,” rather than a genuine peacebuilding intervention (Schultze‐Kraft, , p. 621).…”

“…Underlying the Niger Delta DDR Program is the state's use of monetary incentives to negotiate peace with the insurgents and to create an environment conducive to oil production (Agbiboa, 2015;Ajayi & Adesote, 2013;Davidheiser & Nyiayaana, 2011;Eke, 2015;Obi, 2014;B. Okonofua, 2016;Schultze-Kraft, 2017;Ushie, 2013).…”

Understanding Organised Violence and Crime in Political Settlements: Oil Wars, Petro‐Criminality and Amnesty in the Niger Delta

“…For what is known, Vice‐President Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijawman from Bayelsa state and other official envoys, including Senator David Brigidi, chair of the federal government's Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee, and representatives of the delta states' Peace and Rehabilitation Committees visited the creeks in the period June–August 2007 to speak with militant commanders and other key stakeholders (Ajayi & Adesote, ; Watts, ). However, these informal talks did not bear fruit and it was not until mid‐2009 that the bulk of the militant commanders accepted—somewhat reluctantly—the presidential amnesty offer, which came on the heels of a tough government military offensive (Eke, ). ‘After concerns about their personal security were allayed, key militant leaders began one by one to surrender their arms and engage in negotiations via third parties or directly with the Nigerian state’ (Nwajiaku‐Dahou, : 305).…”

“…Contribution by a former member of the Niger Delta Technical Committee in a workshop with local and international stakeholders organised by the author in Abuja, 20 February 2013. 10 However, many demobilised mid-ranking commanders and former militant foot soldiers are still awaiting full and effective reintegration into civilian life (Eke, 2015;Ushie, 2013). By the same token, unemployment in the delta remains rife and large-scale oil theft and the illegal refining of stolen crude persists.…”

“…By the same token, unemployment in the delta remains rife and large-scale oil theft and the illegal refining of stolen crude persists. There have also been new outbreaks of violence, including the killings of several ex militant commanders-reportedly at the hands of former comrades who did not demobilise and demobilised rank-and-file fighters who had quarrels with their erstwhile superiors who were pocketing a percentage-or all-of the reintegration stipends (Ajayi & Adesote, 2013;Eke, 2015). Thus, while certainly still not peaceful, for the time being, the situation in the delta appears to be controlled, with the whitewashed ex militant commanders keeping a lid on the reemergence of (violent) discontent.…”