No News Is News: Nonignorable Nonresponse in Roll-Call Data Analysis

Rosas, Guillermo; Shomer, Yael; Haptonstahl, Stephen R.

doi:10.1111/ajps.12148

Cited by 38 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…In 68 percent of votes where a state is absent, it will also be absent on the next roll call. This suggests strongly that absences are not usually indications of discontent with a resolution and should thus not be equated with abstentions, as some scholars do (Rosas, Shomer, and Haptonstahl 2015).…”

Section: Literature Data and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 94%

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Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data

Bailey

Strezhnev

Voeten

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

616

329

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United Nations (UN) General Assembly votes have become the standard data source for measures of states preferences over foreign policy. Most papers use dyadic indicators of voting similarity between states. We propose a dynamic ordinal spatial model to estimate state ideal points from 1946 to 2012 on a single dimension that reflects state positions toward the US-led liberal order. We use information about the content of the UN's agenda to make estimates comparable across time. Compared to existing measures, our estimates better separate signal from noise in identifying foreign policy shifts, have greater face validity, allow for better intertemporal comparisons, are less sensitive to shifts in the UN' agenda, and are strongly correlated with measures of liberalism. We show that the choice of preference measures affects conclusions about the democratic peace.

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Section: Literature Data and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…We assume that absences are distributed as missing at random as in Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004). In a possible future extension, one might examine more nuanced models of absences along the lines of those proposed by Rosas and Shomer (2008) and Rosas, Shomer, and Haptonstahl (2015).…”

Section: Statistical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data

Bailey

Strezhnev

Voeten

2016

Journal of Conflict Resolution

616

329

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…12 Using the extensive division titles provided by www.theyworkforyou.com for the later period of our study (2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013)(2014)(2015) we identify where and 12 Recent advances in the literature on roll call votes have focussed on analysing and accounting for selection effects (Carrubba, Gabel and Hug 2008;Hug 2010;Rosas, Shomer and Haptonstahl 2015). We wholeheartedly agree that accounting for selection of votes is essential when attempting to measure latent characteristics of parties (e.g.…”

Section: Data On Divisions Defections and Debatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament

et al. 2017

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Strong party discipline is a core feature of Westminster parliamentary systems. Parties typically compel Members of Parliament (MPs) to support the party position regardless of MPs' individual preferences. Rebellion, however, does occur. Using an original dataset of MP votes and speeches in the British House of Commons from 1992 to 2015, coupled with new estimations of MPs' ideological positions within their party, we find evidence that MPs use rebellion to strategically differentiate themselves from their party. The strategy that MPs employ is contingent upon an interaction of ideological extremity with party control of government. Extremists are loyal when their party is in the opposition, but these same extremists become more likely to rebel when their party controls government. Additionally, they emphasize their rebellion through speeches. Existing models of rebellion and party discipline do not account for government agenda control and do not explain these patterns.

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“…Abstentions are thus excluded from the analysis. Finally, I follow the standard procedure of excluding votes in which an MP did not participate, leaving over 1 million vote choices; the reason for absence cannot be verified systematically, nor can it automatically be seen as dissent (Cowley and Childs ; Sieberer ; but see Rosas, Shomer, and Haptonstahl ).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Submissive Lobby Fodder or Assertive Political Actors? Party Loyalty of Career Politicians in the UK House of Commons, 2005–15

Heuwieser

2017

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Are career politician members of parliament (MPs) more or less likely to vote against the party line than their peers? Despite growing interest in the behavior of career politicians across parliamentary systems, answers to this question are marked by considerable theoretical and empirical uncertainty. I derive the two most common (but opposing) behavioral predictions before testing them over all legislative votes of two UK House of Commons terms (2005–15) using multilevel modeling of new and disaggregated data on MPs' occupational backgrounds. The finding that career politicians are more likely to rebel challenges conventional wisdom and provides an important empirical foundation for the ongoing debate.

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No News Is News: Nonignorable Nonresponse in Roll-Call Data Analysis

Cited by 38 publications

References 41 publications

Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data

Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data

Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament

Submissive Lobby Fodder or Assertive Political Actors? Party Loyalty of Career Politicians in the UK House of Commons, 2005–15

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