No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails

Bykvist, Krister

doi:10.1093/mind/fzn151

Cited by 68 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…12 The substantial claim of (NEJ) is that the truth of normative explanations of the form 'N because ___' requires that the features that replace the blank include features in the light of which it would be apt or fitting to act or react in a certain way or which would provide reasons to do so. The 'would' is meant to avoid problems such as "solitary goods": good states of affairs that entail that there are no past, present, or future subjects to adopt the fitting responses (Bykvist 2009). A putative normative explanation that fails (NEJ) is a failed normative explanation: false, incorrect, or no explanation at all, depending on our ideology of explanation.…”

Section: The Justification Condition On Normative Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normative Explanation And Justification^*

Väyrynen

2019

Nous

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Normative explanations of why things are wrong, good, or unfair are ubiquitous in ordinary practice and normative theory. This paper argues that normative explanation is subject to a justification condition: a correct complete explanation of why a normative fact holds must identify features that would go at least some way towards justifying certain actions or attitudes. I first explain and motivate the condition I propose. I then support it by arguing that it fits well with various theories of normative reasons, makes good sense of certain legitimate moves in ordinary normative explanatory discourse, and helps to make sense of our judgments about explanatory priority in certain cases of normative explanation. This last argument also helps to highlight respects in which normative explanation won't be worryingly discontinuous with explanations in other domains even though these other explanations aren't subject to the justification condition. Thus the paper aims not only to do some constructive theorizing about the relatively neglected topic of normative explanation but also to cast light on the broader question of how normative explanation may be similar to and different from explanations in other domains.

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Section: The Justification Condition On Normative Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normative Explanation And Justification^*

Väyrynen

2019

Nous

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“…Bykvist (2009), p. 5. Bykvist assumes, plausibly, that states of affairs are value-bearers, but he is open to the possibility of there being other kinds of value-bearers as well.…”

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confidence: 99%

The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge

Hurtig

2018

Philos Stud

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This paper is concerned with the implication from value to fittingness. I shall argue that those committed to this implication face a serious explanatory challenge. This argument is not intended as a knock-down argument against FA but it will, I think, show that those who endorse the theory incur a particular explanatory burden: to explain how counterfactual (dis)favouring of actual (dis)value is possible. After making two important preliminary points (about one of the primary motivations behind the theory and what this implies, respectively) I briefly discuss an objection to FA made by Krister Bykvist a few years ago. The point of discussing this objection is to enable me to more easily present my own, and I believe stronger, version of that objection. The overall argument takes the form of, simply, a counterexample which can be constructed on the back of (an acceptance) of my two preliminary points. Throughout the paper I try to respond to various objections.

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“…For some additional objections to the FA analysis, see e.g. Bykvist (2009) and Reisner (2009Reisner ( , 2015. 2015: 144-145).…”

Section: Some Illustrative Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way

Garcia

2018

Philosophia

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Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes.

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No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails

Cited by 68 publications

References 7 publications

Normative Explanation And Justification^*

Normative Explanation And Justification^*

The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge

The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way

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No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails

Cited by 68 publications

References 7 publications

Normative Explanation And Justification*

Normative Explanation And Justification*

The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge

The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Normative Explanation And Justification^*

Normative Explanation And Justification^*