No evidence for unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A failed replication and extension

Abstract

In a recent study, Kouchaki and Gino (2016) suggest that memory for unethical actions is impaired, regardless of whether such actions are real or imagined. However, as we argue in the current study, their claim that people develop "unethical amnesia" confuses two distinct and dissociable memory deficits: one affecting the phenomenology of remembering and another affecting memory accuracy. To further investigate whether unethical amnesia affects memory accuracy, we conducted three studies exploring unethical amnesia for imagined ethical violations. The first study (N = 228) attempts to directly replicate the only study from Kouchaki and Gino (2016) that includes a measure of memory accuracy. The second study (N = 232) attempts again to replicate these accuracy effects from Kouchaki and Gino (2016), while including several additional variables meant to potentially help in finding the effect. The third study (N = 228) is an attempted conceptual replication using the same paradigm as Kouchaki and Gino (2016), but with a new vignette describing a different moral violation. We did not find an unethical amnesia effect involving memory accuracy in any of our three studies. These results cast doubt upon the claim that memory accuracy is impaired for imagined unethical actions. Suggestions for further ways to study memory for moral and immoral actions are discussed.

Motivated misremembering of selfish decisions

“…This possibility coheres with evidence that people are able to "suppress" awareness of unwanted memories at both encoding and retrieval 24 . It is also consistent with recent evidence that memories for dishonest behavior (e.g., cheating) are less subjectively vivid than memories of honest actions 25 , and that memories are less accurate when recounting relevant moral rules after cheating 26,27 , relevant story details after hypothetical acts of cheating ( 25 , but see also 28 ), and selfish relative to altruistic behavior 29 . However, it remains an open question whether people who violate their own moral standards actually misremember their behavior in a self-serving direction.…”

“…Together, our findings highlight the importance of assessing selfishness as it is perceived by social decision-makers-that is, relative to their own, subjective moral beliefs. More crucially, these findings contribute to a growing literature on the motivated nature of memory [25][26][27][28][29][46][47][48] by supporting the idea that people can misremember not just rules, or hypothetical situations, but also concrete actions.…”

Motivated misremembering of selfish decisions

“…This possibility coheres with evidence that people are able to "suppress" awareness of unwanted memories at both encoding and retrieval 24 . It is also consistent with recent evidence that memories for dishonest behavior (e.g., cheating) are less subjectively vivid than memories of honest actions 25 , and that memories are less accurate when recounting relevant moral rules after cheating 26,27 , relevant story details after hypothetical acts of cheating (Kouchaki and Gino 25 , but see also Stanley et al 28 ), and selfish relative to altruistic behavior 29 . However, it remains an open question whether people who violate their own moral standards actually misremember their behavior in a self-serving direction.…”

“…Together, our findings highlight the importance of assessing selfishness as it is perceived by social decision-makersthat is, relative to their own, subjective moral beliefs. More crucially, these findings contribute to a growing literature on the motivated nature of memory [25][26][27][28][29][46][47][48] by supporting the idea that people can misremember not just rules, or hypothetical situations, but also concrete actions. Specifically, these findings suggest that those who violate (as opposed to uphold) their personal standards misremember the extent of their selfishness.…”

Remembering moral and immoral actions in constructing the self

“…The readiness with which we recall events showcasing our positive traits does not imply that we are more likely to forget experiences that portray the self negatively (Stanley, Yang, & De Brigard, 2018). When confronted by our own past shortcomings and failures, it is still possible to achieve a positive view of the self in the present by constructing a life narrative in which negative experiences represent turning points or indications of self-improvement over time (Conway, 2005;Libby & Eibach, 2002;Wilson & Ross, 2003).…”