No Country for Leftists? Clientelist Continuity and the 2006 Vote in the Brazilian Northeast

Abstract

Building upon recent studies of the electoral effects of social policy and President Lula da Silva's coattails in the 2006 Brazilian elections, this article explains the performance of leftist and conservative candidates in elections for governor during that cycle in the Northeast region. The study assesses three systemic factors: the conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Família, economic growth, and Lula's coattails on support for right-wing incumbents and left-wing oppositions in the states of Bahia, Maranhão, and Ceará. Based on the analysis of an original municipal-level dataset and a survey of partisan elites, the findings underscore the importance of urbanbased party building strategies across the three states and patterns of elite alliances specific to each state. Alliances made in the capitals coupled with divided conservative establishments, facilitated leftist victories in the examined states. At the same time, variations in alliance patterns and leftist party development across the three states reveal that conservative clientele networks remain vibrant bases of right-wing support, especially in the interior, and despite either social policy or Lula's coattails.

Governing Countries: A Theory of Subnational Regime Variation

“…Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and the United States are most commonly examined (Beer 2003;Behrend 2011;Benton 2012;Borges 2011;Hale 2007;Herrmann 2010;Gervasoni 2010;Giraudy 2015;Gibson 2013;Hill 1994;Lankina and Getachew 2006;Lawson 2000;Magaloni, et al 2007;McMann and Petrov 2000;Mickey 2015;Montero 2010;Moraski and Reisinger 2003).…”

Whither Clientelism? Good Governance and Brazil's <I>Bolsa Família</I> Program

“…5 Many studies have noted the Bolsa's positive effects on the electoral prospects of the former presidential candidate most closely identified with it, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. 7 By cutting out state governments from administering the program, federal officials effectively bypassed one important historic source of resource diversion. 7 By cutting out state governments from administering the program, federal officials effectively bypassed one important historic source of resource diversion.…”

Uma avaliação empírica da competição eleitoral para a Câmara Federal no Brasil

“…Cabe destacar que trabalhos mais recentes, como Avelino et al (2011), avançam nesta discussão ao aplicar indicadores mais precisos sobre a concentração regional do voto e acabam contemporizando os resultados previstos pela literatura ao mostrar que a concentração não parece ser a estratégia adotada pelos deputados. De qualquer maneira, a formação destas áreas assemelhar-se-ia à formação dos grotões, áreas mais afastadas dos centros urbanos, em geral menos desenvolvidas, e onde os políticos teriam maiores condições de perpetuarem-se no poder (MONTERO, 2010;CAMPELLO e ZUCCO, 2008). Estas áreas estariam mais sujeitas à dominância política, onde o controle político conservador seria mais presente, o que está de acordo com a formação dos distritos informais.…”