No conflict control in the absence of awareness

Ansorge, Ulrich; Fuchs, Isabella; Khalid, Shah; Kunde, Wilfried

doi:10.1007/s00426-010-0313-4

Cited by 56 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…Nevertheless, as task relevance of conflict is an important factor for conflict adaptation (Hazeltine, Lightman, Schwarb, & Schumacher, 2011), further research is needed that directly manipulates task relevance for perceptual conflict (for a relevant methodology, see Ansorge et al, 2011). Concerning the locus of conflict adaptation in terms of level of consciousness, we did not observe unconsciously triggered conflict adaptation on RTs either in Experiment 1 or 3.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 72%

“…Therefore, the observation of unconsciously triggered conflict adaptation has important implications concerning our definition of consciousness. Note, however, that other researchers have failed to observe unconsciously triggered conflict adaptation (e.g., Ansorge, Fuchs, Khalid, & Kunde, 2011;Frings & Wentura, 2008), suggesting that extant conclusions about the role of unconscious stimuli in inducing cognitive control have to be taken with caution.…”

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confidence: 93%

“…Most studies reporting unconscious conflict adaptation have used a 2 ϫ 2 stimuli/response mapping (Desender et al, 2013;van Gaal et al, 2010; but see Kunde, 2003), whereas studies in which adaptation was restricted to conscious primes typically used larger stimulus sets (e.g., Ansorge et al, 2011;Frings & Wentura, 2008;Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996). If this difference is of crucial importance, it might be the case that only the overall conflict is susceptible to unconsciously triggering adaptation, whereas the more specific types may not be.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Dissociating perception from action during conscious and unconscious conflict adaptation.

Atas

Desender

Gevers

et al. 2016

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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The detection of a conflict between relevant and irrelevant information on a given trial typically results in a smaller conflict effect on the next trial. This sequential effect has been interpreted as an expression of cognitive control implemented to resolve conflict. In this context, 2 different but related issues have received increasing attention in the literature. The first issue is whether the detection of motor conflict is necessary to induce cognitive control or, alternatively, whether the detection of perceptual conflict is sufficient. The second issue concerns whether awareness of the conflict is necessary to induce cognitive control. Here, we address both issues in a single design. Our reaction-time (RT) results indicate that conflict-driven control is domain-specific. The detection of perceptual conflict on the previous trial selectively reduces perceptual conflict on the next trial. Similarly, the detection of motor conflict on the previous trial selectively reduces motor conflict on the next trial. For errors, adaptive control seemed to be more general: The detection of perceptual or motor conflict on the previous trial reduced the frequency of errors on response-conflict trials. Furthermore, unconsciously triggered conflict adaptation was observed, but not systematically. Results on errors provide some evidence that sensitivity to an unconscious conflict on the previous trial reduces the frequency of errors on the current trial. For RT analyses however, unconscious conflict appeared not to be sufficient to induce cognitive control. This pattern of results is in line with previous studies examining the role of consciousness in conflict adaptation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 72%

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confidence: 93%

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confidence: 99%

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Dissociating perception from action during conscious and unconscious conflict adaptation.

Atas

Desender

Gevers

et al. 2016

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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“…In incompatible trials, it would detect response conflict and suppress the direct route, which is responsible for the activation of the incorrect response. The suppression of the direct route would lead, in turn, to a reduction of the Simon effect in the following trial (e.g., Ansorge, Fuchs, Khalid, & Kunde, 2011). In line with this view, sequential modulations of the Simon effect should occur only when we have to respond and want to avoid the selection of the incorrect response, whereas it should not be observed when no response has to be selected.…”

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confidence: 88%

Is cognitive control automatic? New insights from transcranial magnetic stimulation

2016

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Cognitive control has been classically considered as a flexible process engaged to pursue intentional behaviors, as distinct from automatic processes, which are unintentional, inflexible, and triggered by unconscious mechanisms. Our study challenged this view, showing that such a distinction may not be so clear-cut. We analyzed motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) elicited by transcranial magnetic stimulation to investigate the neurocognitive mechanisms occurring in a conflict task during trials that either required or did not require a response. We observed a Simon effect on MEPs and sequential modulations of such effects on both kinds of trials. Sequential modulations are usually explained as resulting from the engagement of intentional control mechanisms. Our findings rule against this idea, suggesting that these effects are the result of a mechanism that detects and resolves conflict even when there is no intention to select any response. Accordingly, cognitive control also seems to operate without intention, acting in an automatic fashion.

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“…Although it is now widely accepted that low-level processing, such as the processing of color and shape (Breitmeyer, Ro, & Singhal, 2004;Klotz & Neumann, 1999;Ro et al, 2009;Schmidt, 2002), occurs unconsciously, evidence for unconscious high-level information processing remains mixed. For example, whereas some studies have shown cognitive control (e.g., conflict adaptation, error detection) without perceptual awareness (O'Connell et al, 2007;van Gaal, Lamme, & Ridderinkhof, 2010), other studies suggest that awareness is necessary for these high-level processes (Ansorge, Fuchs, Khalid, & Kunde, 2011;Kunde, 2003;Woodman, 2010). A possible reason for these discrepancies may be due to restricted visual inputs that are frequently used to study visual awareness rather than the necessity of awareness for higher level processing per se.…”

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confidence: 99%

Perceptual overloading reveals illusory contour perception without awareness of the inducers

Persuh

Emmanouil

2016

Atten Percept Psychophys

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Unconscious perception is frequently examined by restricting visual input (e.g., using short stimulus durations followed by masking) to prevent that information from entering visual awareness. Failures to demonstrate perception without awareness may thus be a consequence of this restricted input rather than of limitations in unconscious perception. Here, we demonstrate a novel method that circumvents these significant drawbacks inherent in other methods. Using this new perceptual overloading technique (POT), in which stimuli are repeatedly presented in alternation with a stream of variable masks, we demonstrate illusory contour perception and modal completion even when subjects are completely unaware of the inducing elements. In addition to demonstrating a powerful new method to study consciousness by effectively gating robust visual input from visual awareness, we show that more complex contextual effects, previously considered to be a privilege only of conscious vision, can occur without awareness.

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No conflict control in the absence of awareness

Abstract: Altogether, the results support the conclusion that awareness of visual primes is important for controlling conflict in visuo-motor processing.

Cited by 56 publications

References 50 publications

Dissociating perception from action during conscious and unconscious conflict adaptation.

Dissociating perception from action during conscious and unconscious conflict adaptation.

Is cognitive control automatic? New insights from transcranial magnetic stimulation

Perceptual overloading reveals illusory contour perception without awareness of the inducers

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