2005
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-230-20476-8
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Nineteenth-Century Europe

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Cited by 9 publications
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“…The peace settlements of 1814–1815, in this context, were “ultimately directed against revolution and therefore against nationalism, which was seen to be a revolutionary force” (Gildea 1987:55). In the words of Mansfield and Snyder (1995:85), “Europe’s ruling elites decided to band together in 1815 in the Concert of Europe to contain the twin evils of nationalism and democratization” and “tried to unite in squelching demands for constitutions, electoral and social democracy, and national self‐determination.” The so‐called “conservative order” (Rapport 2005:55–158), or the Holy Alliance among the reactionary monarchs,…”
Section: Military Competition Political Survival and The Rise Of Namentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The peace settlements of 1814–1815, in this context, were “ultimately directed against revolution and therefore against nationalism, which was seen to be a revolutionary force” (Gildea 1987:55). In the words of Mansfield and Snyder (1995:85), “Europe’s ruling elites decided to band together in 1815 in the Concert of Europe to contain the twin evils of nationalism and democratization” and “tried to unite in squelching demands for constitutions, electoral and social democracy, and national self‐determination.” The so‐called “conservative order” (Rapport 2005:55–158), or the Holy Alliance among the reactionary monarchs,…”
Section: Military Competition Political Survival and The Rise Of Namentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nationalism as a revolutionary movement had failed in the first half of the nineteenth century, and when it triumphed in the second half, it was no longer revolutionary (Gildea 1987:100; Best 1982:244). In this environment, the governing elites either learned to tame the nationalist tiger in domestic politics through populist policies—as exemplified by the Bismarckian politics in Prussia (and later Germany) where the governing elites utilized nationalism as well as social welfare policies to contain revolutionary currents—or were replaced by leaders who were adept at these strategies, exemplified by Louis Napoleon’s ascent to power (Rapport 2005, 200–224).…”
Section: Military Competition Political Survival and The Rise Of Namentioning
confidence: 99%