Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-Violence Link in the Niger Delta

Abstract

This paper studies the oil-violence link in the Niger Delta, systematically taking into consideration domestic and international contextual factors. The case study, which focuses on explaining the increase in violence since the second half of the 1990s, confirms the differentiated interplay of resource-specific and non-resource-specific causal factors. With regard to the key contextual conditions responsible for violence, the results underline the basic relevance of cultural cleavages and political-institutional and socioeconomic weakness that existed even before the beginning of the "oil era." Oil has indirectly boosted the risk of violent conflicts through a further distortion of the national economy. Moreover, the transition to democratic rule in 1999 decisively increased the opportunities for violent struggle, in a twofold manner: firstly, through the easing of political repression and, secondly, through the spread of armed youth groups, which have been fostered by corrupt politicians. These incidents imply that violence in the Niger Delta is increasingly driven by the autonomous dynamics of an economy of violence: the involvement of security forces, politicians and (international) businessmen in illegal oil theft helps to explain the perpetuation of the violent conflicts at a low level of intensity.

Nigeria: In Search of Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta through the Amnesty Programme

“…To neglect utterly environmental and human rights issues of the people in exploration of resources is known to bring about crises and catastrophes as witnessed in the Niger Delta and Canada, among other notable spots in the world. Indeed, Nigeria presents a perfect example of a curse that natural resource can bring (Mähler, 2010;Collier & Hoeffler, 2001). Although, oil exploitation in commercial quantity began in 1958, two years after it was discovered in Oloibiri (now in Bayelsa State), with increase in revenue generation to the federal, State and local governments, the poverty level in Nigeria however continues to increase.…”

Private and Corporate Coping in Crises Management: Concepts Versus Occurences

“…Field analysis confirmed views of authors; lack of engagement and development of the people and region, unfavorable government policies, environmental pollution and degradation which led to loss of natural resources and means of livelihood, absence of basic infrastructures, high cost of living and unemployment rates are the chief culprits behind Niger Delta crises (Ikediobi & Marvin, 2010;Mahler, 2010;Obi, 2009Obi, & 2010Ojakorotu, 2011;O'Neill, 2007;Watts, 2010). Folkman and Moskowitz (2000), and Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, Delongis, and Gruen (1986) agreed that conditions, attributes of persons involved, and environment influence coping capabilities.…”

Drilling Deeper: A Systematic, Context-Sensitive Investigation of Causal Mechanisms in the Oil–Conflict Link

“…In Nigeria, the preconditions for an Algeria-type scenario are partly present (see, for example, Mähler, 2010;Zinn, 2005). Although substantial economic grievances do obviously exist, a national, cohesive and ideologically driven opposition has failed to emerge -which reflects the entrenched ethnic and religious cleavages at the national level between the north and the south on the one hand, and diverse ethnic cleavages within the resource extraction area on the other.…”

“…In this particular case, the opening initially enabled more rebellion, underlining the point that not only too much but also little repression may result in violence. After years of brutal repression under authoritarian rule, the popularly elected governments of Olesegun Obasanjo and Yar' Adua used repression more selectively and intermittently, thus facilitating the rise of state-based and one-sided violence (Mähler, 2010). In 2009, the government introduced an amnesty for the Niger Delta rebels.…”