Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality

Owen, David

doi:10.1017/upo9781844653966

Cited by 69 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Indeed, who can engage in and successfully pursue Nietzsche's revaluation through to completion depends on who has the right psychological profile-that is to say, the cognitive, affective and motivational receptivity necessary to reassess and alter his evaluative commitments in light of whatever theoretical or practical considerations are presented to him. It remains a matter of interpretative contention as to how many or few people will be able to effectively engage in revaluationit could be just a select few (Leiter, 2002) or a lot more widespread (Ridley, 2005;Owen, 2007). ST leaves this interpretative dispute open: who can effectively engage in revaluation is an empirical and contingent matter, depending on who has the right sort of psychological configuration.…”

Section: The Revaluative Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Normativity for Nietzschean Free Spirits

Robertson

2011

Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A significant portion of recent literature on Nietzsche is devoted to his metaethical views, both critical and positive. This article explores one aspect of his positive metaethics. The specific thesis defended is that Nietzsche is, or is plausibly cast as, a reasons internalist. This, very roughly, is the view that what an agent has normative reason to do depends on that agent's motivational repertoire. Section I sketches some of the metaethical terrain most relevant to Nietzsche's organising ethical project, his "revaluation of all values", and lays out three "design-requirements" that an adequate account of Nietzsche's metaethical views must satisfy. Section II introduces the basic internalist position. Sections III-IV provide textual support for the internalist reading of Nietzsche, with Section V showing how it meets each of the design-requirements. Section VI concludes by showing how the internalist apparatus also illuminates Nietzsche's views about the process of revaluing values.A significant portion of recent literature on Nietzsche is devoted to his metaethical views, both critical and positive. 1 Nietzsche does not have a well worked-out metaethics in our contemporary sense, any more than his contemporaries did, if by that we mean to include clear views about the ontological, epistemological and semantic commitments of ethical discourse. Nevertheless he does have, and certainly needs, views that are metaethical in a broader sense, concerning the nature and justification of the first-order ethical standpoints he variously opposes and espouses. This article explores one aspect of his positive metaethics in this broader sense. The specific thesis defended is that Nietzsche is-or is plausibly cast as 2 -a reasons internalist. This, very roughly, is the view that what an agent has normative reason to do depends

show abstract

Section: The Revaluative Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Clark, 2001;Owen, 2007). Owen & Robertson (forthcoming) provides support for thinking Nietzsche also influenced Williams' account of reasons.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Normativity for Nietzschean Free Spirits

Robertson

2011

Inquiry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This point is equally salient in addressing the second claim since Nietzsche's account of how we have become more reflective through the aegis of the ascetic ideal provides a detailed account of how we have developed the reflective capacities for self‐discipline, self‐surveillance and self‐overcoming that are integral to reflective ethical commitment and self‐rule (Nietzsche 1998b, III; cf. Owen 1998 and 2007a). It would seem that Nietzsche in the Genealogy defeats his own (earlier) argument for aristocracy in Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche 2002).…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a highly insightful discussion of Nietzsche's purposes, see Janaway (2007, ch. 6) and also Owen (2007a, ch. 5).…”

mentioning

confidence: 93%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Pluralism and the Pathos of Distance (or How to Relax with Style): Connolly, Agonistic Respect and the Limits of Political Theory

Owen¹

2008

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to have power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among our youth, and to make a character that is well-bred, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness. For these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of punishment; living by passion they pursue the pleasures appropriate to their character and the means to them, and avoid the opposite pains, and have not even a conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it. What argument would remould such people? It is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have long since been incorporated in the character; and perhaps we must be content if, when all the influences by which we are thought to become good are present, we get some tincture of virtue. Now some think we are made good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching. Nature's part evidently does not depend on us, but as

show abstract

Slave Morality

Brace

2014

The Encyclopedia of Political Thought

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“Slave morality” is a concept most closely associated with the political thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, and in its distinction between master and slave, it recalls G. W. F. Hegel's master/slave dialectic. Both examine the value of morality to give an ethical account of political agency and of freedom. The idea of a distinct “slave morality” works on the assumption that the state is always characterized by a political hierarchy, an order that distinguishes between nobles and slaves. That political distinction is then transformed into a psychological concept of rank, so that the nobles (or the masters) are able to tell and control the story of freedom, and of morality, and to oppress their slaves on the grounds that “the slaves of history are those who lack the spirit of freedom.” Such accounts of morality raise questions about possible counternarratives of freedom for the “slaves of history,” and about how to understand the agency and selfhood of those who have been systematically marginalized, dominated, and defined by others with more power.

show abstract

Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality

Cited by 69 publications

References 0 publications

Normativity for Nietzschean Free Spirits

Normativity for Nietzschean Free Spirits

Pluralism and the Pathos of Distance (or How to Relax with Style): Connolly, Agonistic Respect and the Limits of Political Theory

Slave Morality

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About