“…Prior studies about loan guarantee in China discussed the motivation of loan guarantees (e.g., Arasu et al, 2021;Beck et al, 2010;Chang & Hong, 2000;Fisman & Wang, 2010;Kumari et al, 2021;Shim, 2006;Uesugi et al, 2010;Wang, 2004), determinants of loan guarantee (e.g., Chen et al, 2011;Feng et al, 2005;Jian & Xu, 2012;Li, 2010;Luo & Tang 2007;Wang & Lin, 2007;) and economic consequences of loan guarantee (e.g. Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006;Chatterjee, 2019;Ehsan et al, 2021;Gao & Song, 2007;Gong & Wu, 2005;Jun et al, 2021;Khanna & Palepu, 2000;Laeven, 2003;Liu et al, 2020;Ma et al, 2014;Matloob et al, 2020;Nguyen et al, 2020;Saleem et al, 2019;Samujh et al, 2012;Shabbir & Wisdom, 2020;Shabbir et al, 2020a,b;Sheng et al, 2016;Uroos et al, 2021;Wang & Luo, 2006;Yu et al, 2020;Wang et al, 2014;Zhang & Jiao, 2017). Hirst et al (2008) suggested that MEF is a critical voluntary disclosure mechanism that can influence a firm's reputation by providing a transparent and accurate report about the firm's credibility.…”