New Rules for Corporate Governance in the United States And Germany - A Model for New Zealand?

Abstract

This paper surveys the possibilities for implementing new rules for corporate governance in New Zealand. It focuses on the new rules issued in Germany (the German Code of Corporate Governance) and the United States (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). The paper analyses both to find out which rules might be appropriate for New Zealand. It is argued that New Zealand needs to adopt a code of corporate governance in order to keep up with international developments, otherwise it risks repelling local investors and failing to attract international investors. It is concluded that most importantly New Zealand should adopt a principles-based "comply-or-explain" approach rather than strict rules, as it offers greater flexibility. The paper further concludes that many of the rules issued in Germany and the United States could improve corporate governance in New Zealand and hence should be implemented.

Managerialism in Germany and centralism in Iran: Two tier board, one tier control in Germany and one tier board, two tier control in Iran

“…The codetermination and banks representatives in the company are not inherent features of the two tier system and it is quite possible and according to some authors favorable (Lutter, 2001) to have such a system without them. May be the inspector or the inspectors' board, as suggested by some authors (Krackhardt, 2005), as the judiciary like organ designed in the Iran's law; can solve the problem of corruption in the German companies. In fact, half of the inspectors job in Iran is likely in Germany being done in respect to management board by the supervisory board, to the extent that it is said that "the main function of the supervisory board of an AG is to supervise the management (AktG, § 111(1)) by means of the control and inspection of the managers' actions" (Joachim, 1991).…”