New results in biclique cryptanalysis of full round GIFT

Abstract

Security of a recently proposed bitwise block cipher GIFT is evaluated in this paper. In order to mount full round attacks on the cipher, biclique cryptanalysis method is applied. Both variants of the block cipher are attacked using Independent biclique approach. For recovering the secret keys of GIFT-64, the proposed attack requires 2127.45 full GIFT-64 encryption and 28 chosen plain texts. For recovering the secret keys of GIFT-128, the proposed attack requires 2127.82 full GIFT-128 encryption and 218 chosen plain texts. The attack complexity is compared with that of other attacks proposed previously. The security level of GIFT is also compared with that of the parent block cipher PRESENT, based on the analysis.

Machine learning-based lightweight block ciphers for resource-constrained internet of things networks: a review

“…− Related-key attacks: These attacks leverage similarities in the key schedules of different ciphers to break one cipher and then attack others. The recent proposal of the Biclique cryptanalysis technique has shown promise in exploiting related-key relationships in some block ciphers, raising concerns about potential vulnerabilities in cipher families [38]. − Algebraic attacks: These attacks utilize algebraic properties of the cipher's S-boxes or round functions to find weaknesses.…”