New Public Management, Public Service Bargains and the challenges of interdepartmental coordination: a comparative analysis of top civil servants in state administration

Abstract

In this article we are interested in how the coordinating role of top civil servants is related to the argument that country-level differences in the adoption of New Public Management significantly alter the Public Service Bargains of top civil servants and consequently their capacity to accomplish interdepartmental coordination. A managerial PSB limits top civil servants’ role in interdepartmental coordination, as their focus will be on achieving goals set for their specific departments, rather than for the central government as a collective. We test our argument with empirical insights from a comparative analysis of five countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. We find that our argument is only partly valid and discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of the analysis. Points for practitioners Alongside the introduction of New Public Management, the relationships between ministers and their top civil servants in state administration have evolved. At the same time, societal issues are getting more complex and demand a holistic, cross-sector approach. The concept of a managerial Public Service Bargain is used to analyze changes in top civil servants’ role and the impact of reforms on the capacity of top civil servants to accomplish interdepartmental coordination. Practitioners can learn more about the close link between challenges for interdepartmental coordination and changes in the role and functioning of top civil servants.

E-government Policy and its Implementation in the Czech Republic: Selected Shortcomings

“…These shortcomings are also reflected in the low involvement of stakeholders in project design and evaluation, and supplemented by low levels of awareness and take-up of existing services. Frequent changes at the national level of e-government implementation (and coordination) also limit the top civil servants in holding their pivotal position in enhancing interdepartmental coordination (Hansen, Steen & de Jong, 2013).…”

Coordination of and Through E-Government: The Case of the Czech Republic

“…Th is raises the relevancy of the concept of sleeping accountability even higher due to frequent changes in political and executive management (and coordination) limiting the consistent long-term development of e-government. Th ese changes also prevent top civil servants from holding pivotal positions in enhancing interdepartmental coordination (Hansen et al 2012).…”

Politicians, political advisers and the vocabulary of public service bargains: Speaking in tongues?

“…Hood and Lodge's typology has been put to work for a range of purposes, including to determine the empirical particulars of the reward, competence and loyalty structures of bargains across (principally European) nations (Lodge ; Hansen and Salomonsen ; Hondeghem ), to explain the challenges of inter‐departmental coordination (Hansen et al ) and to examine changing relationships between ministers and senior officials (Salomonsen and Knudsen ; Van Dorpe and Horton ).…”

“…A central focus has been the extent to which New Public Management (NPM) reforms have occasioned changes in PSBs (De Visscher et al ; Salomonsen and Knudsen ; Steen and Van der Meer ; Hansen et al ). Scholars have described the emergence of a post‐Schafferian bargain privileging managerial imperatives (or what Hood and Lodge (, p. 177) call a ‘thermostatic’ bargain) (Hansen et al ; Hondeghem and Steen ; Hondeghem and Van Dorpe ). The reverse relationship is also explored in comparative terms when PSBs are deployed as a lens for ‘understanding convergence and divergence in the context of public management reforms’ (Hondeghem and Steen , p. 4).…”

“…The logic of the latter – if the new institutional economics informing the NPM is an enabler – is towards the use of classical contracting to address the asymmetries that leave political principals open to the predations of their agents: who better to advise on the nature of and to monitor compliance with the contract than the political adviser? The narrative arc tends to unfold over three acts: the institutionalization of NPM principles has altered senior officials’ roles; a new class of adviser has emerged (who plays new roles or commandeers those once played by public servants); and extant PSBs have been renegotiated accordingly (Bourgault and Van Dorpe ; Hansen et al ; Bezes and Lodge ).…”