: Empirically, unemployment is highly volatile while inflation displays inertia, even though marginal cost is pro-cyclical. It was argued that real wage rigidities would no longer help replicate these facts, once firms determine employment and hours per worker.In this paper, real wage stickiness stems from wage bargaining with credible threat points, that we embed into a New Keynesian framework in which firms adjust both labor margins.This model notably reproduces the large jump in unemployment in the Great Recession.Moreover, inflation inertia is made consistent with pro-cyclical marginal cost since the credible bargaining induces strategic complementarities between firms.JEL Classification : E32, E50, J63, J64.Keywords : New-Keynesian model, labor market frictions, unemployment, inflation, real wage rigidities.Extrait : Empiriquement, le taux de chômage est fortement volatile aux Etats-Unis alors que l´inflation est inerte, bien que le coût marginal soit pro-cyclique. La littérature a montré que les rigidités de salaire réel ne permettaient plus de répliquer ces faits stylisés lorsque les entreprises ajustent l´emploi et les heures par travailleur. Dans ce papier, les rigidités de salaire réel proviennent de la négociation salariale crédible, introduite dans un modèle Néo-Keynésien avec frictions sur le marché du travail. Les entreprises ajustent l´emploi et les heures par travailleur. Ce modèle réplique en particulier la forte augmentation du taux de chômage liéeà la Grande Récession. En outre, l´inertie de l´inflation est rendue compatible avec un coût marginal pro-cyclique dans la mesure où la négociation crédible implique des complémentarités stratégiques entre les entreprises.Codes JEL : E32, E50, J63, J64. In this paper, we argue that those failures are not related to real wage rigidities per se, but instead to the way these rigidities are introduced. The literature traditionally integrates those rigidities through the lens of an ad-hoc wage norm. Here, real wage stickiness results from wage bargaining with credible threat points (Hall and Milgrom (2008)) which corresponds to the sequential bargaining game of Rubinstein (1982). We introduce this wage bargaining into a New Keynesian framework with matching frictions in the labor market.Firms adjust both labor margins and set prices.We first show that this model replicates the high volatility of unemployment, as well as the small and persistent movements in inflation, that characterize US post-war data. Moreover, the model displays inflation inertia in a way consistent with the pro-cyclical behavior of marginal cost. We next use our framework to address the "missing deflation puzzle" raised by Hall (2011), namely the unability of New Keynesian models to restitute the small decline in inflation that followed the financial crisis of 2008. We show that the model reproduces the 2 impulse response functions for both unemployment and inflation after the financial shock, making the weak fall in inflation consistent with the deep economic slack. We finall...