New Institutionalist Leadership – how the new European Council-dominated crisis governance paradoxically strengthened the role of EU institutions

Abstract

This article explores the impact that the rise of a new, European Council-dominated Union has had for role of EU institutions in the most important issues of the past decade. Building on rational institutionalist theories of leadership, we first develop a New Institutionalist Leadership model that helps us understand the political leadership tasks performed by the European Council and the instrumental leadership tasks that are informally delegated to EU institutions, who then deliver them in the 'the machine room' where broad political guidelines are translated into actual binding reforms. The article then traces the empirical evolution of New Institutionalist Leadership in two parallel processes: dealing with concrete reforms such as the Fiscal Compact, and in managing the longer-term reform agenda in what became termed the Leaders' Agenda. Our findings point to the need for EU scholars to pay closer attention to what is going on beneath the headline-dominating activities of the European Council.

Where does the Compass point? The European Commission’s role in the development of EU security and defence policy

“…Bickerton et al 2015), others have argued that the Commission has both become more presidential (Kassim et al 2017; Bürgin 2018) and expanded its political role in other ways (Nugent and Rhinard 2016; 2019; Peterson 2017; Becker et al 2016). Others have also suggested that the ‘new European Council–dominated crisis governance paradoxically [has] strengthened the role of EU institutions’ (Beach and Smeets 2020; see also discussions in Bauer and Becker 2014; Niemann and Ioannou 2015). The research agenda should hence continue to focus on what these new developments will mean for the democratic and political accountability of the Union, the political role of the European Commission and the overall (geopolitical) role of the EU.…”

The de-institutionalisation of power beyond the state

“…Internal evaluations of the Troika suggest a pattern of individuals and groups substituting institutional procedure with improvised collaboration 13 (cf. Beach and Smeets, 2020a, 2020b; Henning, 2017). Likewise, an analysis of EU migration policy after 2015 observes that ‘collaboration was informal and flexible, enabling actors to sidestep bureaucratic hierarchies and to cross the intergovernmental / Community pillars’ (Beach and Smeets, 2020a: 12, 2020b: 143).…”

“…Beach and Smeets, 2020a, 2020b; Henning, 2017). Likewise, an analysis of EU migration policy after 2015 observes that ‘collaboration was informal and flexible, enabling actors to sidestep bureaucratic hierarchies and to cross the intergovernmental / Community pillars’ (Beach and Smeets, 2020a: 12, 2020b: 143). Informal networks, taskforces and other extra- and trans-institutional arrangements have become recurrent features of EU governance.…”

“…Individuals acquire the role of ‘fix-it’ people, redeployed from one area to another to reinforce the EU’s basic policies against the challenges of the moment. Such formations do not map well onto institutional units and are defined less by issue-specific competence than the capacity of individuals to form good workings ties (Beach and Smeets, 2020a: 14–15, 2020b: 147). Importantly, they are networks founded on interpersonal trust, and their centrality has corresponded to the dis trust of established institutions and chains of command, notably around the Community Method.…”