New Estimates of Over 500 Years of Historic GDP and Population Data

Fariss, Christopher J.; Anders, Therese; Markowitz, Jonathan N.; Barnum, Miriam

doi:10.31235/osf.io/8dmqg

Cited by 3 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The result for the interaction (pre-1939), plotted in Figure A4, is similar to the main result. Using the Fariss et al (2017) data on GDP per capita strengthens the conditional relationship for the earlier period in the base model (at p < 0.05), and it even becomes significant (at p < 0.1) with additional controls (Table A31).…”

Section: Robustness Testsmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…Next, since we lose quite some observations with some of our controls, we run the same models with an imputed version of the most important control variable, GDP per capita (Tables A7-A9). We use the variable constructed by Fariss et al (2017), which is based on a range of sources, including the Maddison data. The results basically remain the same, although suffrage becomes insignificant in the base model for the pre-1939 period (Table A8, Model 3).…”

Section: Robustness Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Reassuringly, the results are similar to the ones presented with only legislative elections (Tables A24-A26). This remains the case when we use the Fariss et al (2017) GDP per capita data, which increases the number of observations (Table A27).…”

Section: Robustness Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Voting for bureaucracy? Contestation, suffrage and meritocracy

Andersen

Cornell

2022

European J Political Res

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The relationship between democracy and bureaucracy is the object of both classic and contemporary studies in political science. In classic works, scholars argue that there is an inherent conflict between democracy and bureaucracy, whereas contemporary scholars often assert that democracy is positively related to the development of bureaucracy. We argue that both classic and recent interpretations of the relationship are too simplistic since the two dimensions of democracy, contestation and inclusiveness, are likely to affect bureaucratic development in different ways. On the one hand, electoral contestation strengthens bureaucracy if voters demand public goods that politicians cater to by employing meritocratic recruitment. On the other hand, we cannot take for granted that all voters demand public goods. As poorer people are enfranchised, popular demands for particularistic goods increase, which incentivizes politicians to keep a patrimonial state administration, thus facilitating clientelistic linkages with the electorate. Based on new and improved data on electoral contestation and meritocratic recruitment and a measure of male suffrage, we examine the separate and combined effects of contestation and suffrage on meritocracy worldwide from 1790 to 2012. We find that contestation is positively related to meritocracy after the advent of World War II when universal suffrage and contested elections were generally introduced simultaneously. Before World War II, when suffrage was limited and only gradually extended to poorer segments, contestation is significantly related to meritocracy only at lower levels of suffrage.

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Section: Robustness Testsmentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Robustness Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Voting for bureaucracy? Contestation, suffrage and meritocracy

Andersen

Cornell

2022

European J Political Res

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“…The GDP data are from (Fariss et al, 2017), who estimate (logged) income level by using a dynamic latent trait model and drawing on information from different GDP datasets. We use their estimates benchmarked in the long time series from the Maddison project (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013).…”

Section: Economic Crisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We continue with a continuous growth measure and return to the t − 1 lag, but use GDP data from the Maddison project (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013) instead of Fariss et al (2017). This change reduces the number of observations from 18,243 country-years in Model 1, Table 1 to 12,331 in Model 1, Table 2.…”

Section: Robustness Testsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic crisis and regime transitions from within

Djuve

Knutsen

2023

Journal of Peace Research

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We study how economic crises relate to the likelihood of experiencing regime changes ‘from within’; that is, transitions brought about, in part or fully, by actors in the incumbent regime. While historically common and influencing the political trajectories of many countries, such processes are far less studied than regime transitions forced by non-incumbent actors, such as coups or revolutions. We synthesize previous arguments and further specify how crises can incentivize leaders to change the regime from within due to two mechanisms. First, crises create windows of opportunity for leaders to pursue transitions they inherently prefer, for instance through self-coup. Second, crises sometimes allow opposition actors to mobilize and threaten the regime, forcing incumbents to liberalize. We leverage new data on timing and mode of regime change for more than 2000 regimes from about 200 countries, during the period 1789–2018. Employing different measurement strategies, estimators, control variables and other specification choices, we find fairly robust evidence that economic crises are related to transitions from within. However, when we distinguish between liberalizing and non-liberalizing guided transitions, we only find that economic crises systematically relate to the latter, suggesting that the window of opportunity mechanism may be especially pertinent in many contexts.

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Butterfly effects in global trade: International borders, disputes, and trade disruption and diversion

Brutger,

Marple

2023

Journal of Peace Research

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This article theorizes and tests how different types of interstate conflict across borders affect trade between disputing parties and trade diversion with third parties. Building on theories of borders as institutions, we differentiate the effects of two types of international disputes – border disputes and escalated militarized disputes – and draw on 60 years of trade and conflict data to test the effects of these disputes on bilateral and third-party trade flows. We find that border disputes and militarized disputes each depress trade flows between the disputing countries. However, legal border disputes are associated with increased trade diversion with non-disputing countries, which may fully offset the forgone bilateral trade, whereas militarized disputes have the opposite effect. These results show that actors engaged in trade can offset bilateral trade losses from a border dispute by expanding trade with third parties not involved in the dispute, but the same cannot be said of offsetting the losses from militarized disputes. The fact that border disputes and militarized disputes have opposite effects on trade diversion highlights the importance of examining both the type of dispute and the type of trade flows that are affected when studying conflict and trade and evaluating the potentially pacifying incentives of international trade.

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New Estimates of Over 500 Years of Historic GDP and Population Data

Cited by 3 publications

References 26 publications

Voting for bureaucracy? Contestation, suffrage and meritocracy

Voting for bureaucracy? Contestation, suffrage and meritocracy

Economic crisis and regime transitions from within

Butterfly effects in global trade: International borders, disputes, and trade disruption and diversion

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