New development: Administrative accountability and early responses during public health crises—lessons from Covid-19 in China

Abstract

The administrative accountability system in China has evolved during public health crises. By holding public officials accountable, the system hopes to improve their performance during emergencies. However, Covid-19 exposed an unexpected effect of the system. Instead of incentivizing public officials to take responsibility, it may have discouraged them from making timely, but potentially risky, decisions. Based on a holistic case analysis of the early response in Wuhan city, the authors demonstrate the lessons learnt and a way to improve the system. The case adds to an increasing academic literature on responsible risk-taking behaviours and decisions under uncertainties, extending the academic discussion by providing the critical contextual information for such behaviours and decisions in China. IMPACT Tolerating decision errors under uncertainty can improve early responses to public health emergencies like Covid-19 in China. This article shows that integrating an error-tolerance mechanism in an evolving accountability system can encourage responsible risk-taking by governmental officials. A well-designed error-tolerance mechanism that distinguishes between errors to tolerate and errors to punish can encourage proactive actions and prevent tardiness under threat of an incoming infectious disease. Readers who can benefit from this study include policy-makers and managers in government, especially those who work in infectious disease prevention and response, emergency management, or any other public services in which decisions under uncertainties are common.

Social media government communication and stakeholder engagement in the era of Covid-19: evidence from Italy

“…If we consider that since the maintenance phase the communication about the health risk emergency is quite limited, the research data show a huge commitment of governments in Covid-19 challenges, especially in the maintenance phase with about 34 posts per day. In this sense, our results confirm the Wang et al (2021b) findings, underlining that the government's reaction to an unexpected health crisis is a "work in progress" with an increasing trend in communication.…”

The Public Servants’ Response When Facing Pandemic: The Role of Public Service Motivation, Accountability Pressure, and Emergency Response Capacity

“…Motivating public servants to perform their duties actively through a strict accountability system and mechanism, with some error tolerance, can help distinguish the types of decision-making errors that are tolerated or penalized. This can encourage public servants to take proactive actions in the threat of an incoming public health crisis [ 77 ].…”

The impact of accountability on local officials’ behavior in the pandemic prevention and control in China based on utility maximization

“…These studies show that officials and official accountability play an important role in epidemic prevention and control. However, Wang et al [33] show that the punishments of China's official accountability system are too severe, which may lead to adverse selection of officials for fear of being held accountable. It is because severe punishments could reduce their motivation and influence their decision-making [34,35].…”