Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions

Figdor, Carrie

doi:10.1086/652964

Cited by 42 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…Churchland 1986, Bickle 2003. In response, others have defended the multiple realizability of functional or psychological properties, usually in conjunction with a defense of the autonomy of psychology Gillett 2009, 2011, forthcoming;Block 1997;Figdor 2010;Fodor 1997;Gold and Stoljar 1999).…”

Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Autonomist psychology-the search for functional analysis without direct constraints from neural structures-usually goes hand in hand with the assumption that each psychological capacity has a unique functional decomposition (which in turn may have multiple realizers). But there is evidence that the same psychological capacity is fulfilled at different times by entirely different neural structures, or different configurations of neural structures, even within the same organism (Edelman and Gally 2001, Friston and Price 2003, Noppeney et al 2004, Figdor 2010. Plausibly each such configuration of neural structures corresponds to a somewhat different functional decomposition.…”

Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

2011

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Synthese; Synthese is available online at:http://www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+and+philosophy+of+science/jou rnal/11229Abstract. We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations.1 This paper was refereed in two rounds. John Symons graciously arranged for a round of blind refereeing; thanks are due to him and the anonymous referees. In addition, thanks to those who refereed the paper non-blindly: Ken Aizawa, Robert Cummins, and Dan Weiskopf. Many thanks to audiences at the 2010 APA Pacific Division, Saint Louis University, and University of Missouri -Columbia. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-0924527 to Gualtiero Piccinini. 2 Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience via Multi-Level Mechanistic ExplanationWhen psychologists explain behavior, the explanations typically make reference to causes that precede the behavior and make a difference to whether and how it occurs.For instance, they explain that Anna ducked because she saw a looming ball. By contrast, when psychologists explain psychological capacities such as stereopsis or working memory, they typically do so by showing that these complex capacities are made up of more basic capacities organized together. In this paper, we focus exclusively on the latter sort of explanation, which is usually referred to as functional analysis. We argue that such decompositional, constitutive explanations gain their explanatory force by describing mechanisms (even approximately and with idealization) and, conversely, that they lack explanatory force to the extent that they fail to describe mechanisms.In arguing for this point, we sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be and in some cases have been integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms, in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations. 3The conclusion that functional analyses are mechanism sketches leads to a simple argument that psychological explanation is mechanistic. It is generally assumed that psychological explanation is functional-that it proceeds via t...

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Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience Via Multi-level Mechmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

2011

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“…Aizawa argues against two premises in what he calls the "Central Argument" of Bechtel and Mundale. Also see Figdor (2010) for additional critique of Bechtel and Mundale. Polger contends that "species-specific variation of mental states is to be expected," a variation of the mental states themselves, not just the underlying neural or otherwise physical states.…”

Section: Empirical Evidence Against Robust Multiple Realizabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Physicalism and the Mind

Francescotti¹

2014

SpringerBriefs in Philosophy

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“…21 Thus defined, evidence for 18 Philosophers usually speak in this context of "multiple realization", a term we shall also use from time to time. For an association of this philosophical term of art with the scientific notion of degeneracy see Figdor 2010. Notice that degeneracy is not the same as redundancy where the same result is produced by the same strategy (Greenspan 2001; see also Greenspan 2003).…”

Section: Degeneracy and Pleiotropymentioning

confidence: 99%

What’s on Your Mind? A Brain Scan Won’t Tell

Levin

Aharon

2011

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Reverse Inference (RI) is an imaging-based type of inference from brain states to mental states, which has become highly widespread in neuroscience, most especially in neuroeconomics. Recent critical studies of RI may be taken to show that, if cautiously used, RI can help achieve research goals that may be difficult to achieve by way of behavior-based procedures alone. But can RI exceed the limits of these procedures and achieve research goals that are impossible for them to achieve alone? By way of answering this question we show that a conception of the mind-type identity-under which the answer is in the positive, is untenable for reasons that strongly support another conception of the mindfunctionalism-under which the answer must be in the negative. On this basis we then conclude that RI cannot exceed the limits of behavior-based procedures in cognitive psychology.

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Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions

Cited by 42 publications

References 70 publications

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches

Physicalism and the Mind

What’s on Your Mind? A Brain Scan Won’t Tell

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