Neuroeconomics, Neurophysiology and the Common Currency Hypothesis

Landreth, Anthony; Bickle, John

doi:10.1017/s0266267108002058

Cited by 28 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The “pure value” stage is one in which values are represented in an abstract and domain-independent (that is, amodal) manner (Landreth and Bickle, 2008; Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Montague and Berns, 2002; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). This pure value stage has the presumed benefit of allowing comparison of dissimilar goods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Choice as an Untangling of Options into Actions

Yoo

Hayden

2018

Neuron

115

123

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SUMMARY We propose that economic choice can be understood as a gradual transformation from domain of options to one of the actions. We draw an analogy with the idea of untangling information in the form vision system and propose that form vision and economic choice may be two aspects of a larger process that sculpts actions based on sensory inputs. From this viewpoint, choice results from the accumulated effect of repetitions of simple computations. These may consist primarily of relative valuations (evaluations relative to the value of rejection, perhaps in a manner akin to divisive normalization) applied to individual offers. With regard to economic choice, cortical brain regions differ primarily in their position and in what information they prioritize, and do not—with a few exceptions—have categorically distinct roles. Each region’s specific contribution is determined largely by its inputs; thus, understanding connectivity is crucial for understanding choice. This view suggests that there is no single site of choice, that there is no meaningful distinction between pre- and post-decisionality, and that there is no explicit representation of value in the brain.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Choice as an Untangling of Options into Actions

Yoo

Hayden

2018

Neuron

115

123

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Camerer et al, 2005;Braeutigam, 2005;Kenning and Plassmann, 2005). With this argument, the paper extends a discussion by Landreth and Bickle (2008), who have centered on a similar question regarding neural substrates of a forward-looking utility notion relevant for decisionmaking ('wanting'). Based on the available evidence, I here argue that utility as measuring rod for welfare, i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 55%

Some Considerations Regarding the Problem of Multidimensional Utility

Binder

2009

SSRN Journal

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The concept of 'utility' is often used in ambiguous ways in economics, from having substantive psychological connotations to being a formal placeholder representing a person's preferences. In the accounts of the early utilitarians, it was a multidimensional measure that has been condensed during the marginalist revolution into the unidimensional measure we know today. But can we compare different pleasures? This paper assesses the evidence from psychology and neurosciences on how to best conceive of utility. It turns out that empirical evidence does not favor a view of multidimensional utility. This does not eliminate the possibility to make a normative argument supporting a multidimensional notion of utility.

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“…food-sharing might serve both the purpose of nutrition and mating, see Gurven 2003). The emergence of a separate decision system in the brain allows for the comparative assessment of different alternatives in terms of a 'common currency' (Landreth andBickle 2008, Glimcher 2009). Another advantage is that this also enables phenotypical flexibility with regard to changing environments, thus creating the condition for what can be regarded the unique adaptive edge of the human species.…”

Section: The Dual Selves View Of Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

The Cultural Science of Consumption: Brains, Networks, and Identities

Herrmann‐Pillath¹

2010

Cultural Science Journal

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The paper proposes a general theory of consumer behaviour in 'social network markets' -where individual choices are determined by the choices of others -by conceptualising such markets as examples of distributed cognition; itself part of an 'externalist' perspective on human identity. The paper goes on to consider the issues raised by this move, by working through the implications of a distinction between the 'object self' (or evaluating agency) and the 'acting self' (or implementing agency), a distinction that is required to account for apparent failures of choice within an individual. It transpires that 'dysfunctional' choices (choices that apparently harm the self) may be evidence of the evolutionary advantage of 'dual selves,' allowing for creativity to cope with novelty through open-ended learning. The paper uses this 'dual selves' approach to rethink semiotics and the emergence of meaning, building up an argument about the importance of copying, narrative and language in constituting identity though distributed cognition.Finally, the paper proposes that cultural science can reintegrate the study of meaning and cognition in order to analyse consumer behaviour and choice.

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Neuroeconomics, Neurophysiology and the Common Currency Hypothesis

Cited by 28 publications

References 13 publications

Economic Choice as an Untangling of Options into Actions

Economic Choice as an Untangling of Options into Actions

Some Considerations Regarding the Problem of Multidimensional Utility

The Cultural Science of Consumption: Brains, Networks, and Identities

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