Neural phase: a new problem for the modal account of epistemic luck

Abstract

One of the most widely recognised intuitions about knowledge is that knowing precludes believing truly as a matter of luck. On Pritchard's highly influential modal account of epistemic luck, luckily true beliefs are, roughly, those for which there are many close possible worlds in which the same belief formed in the same way is false. My aim is to introduce a new challenge to this account. Starting from the observation-as documented by a number of recent EEG studies-that our capacity to detect visual stimuli fluctuates with the phase of our neural oscillations, I argue that there can be very close possible worlds in which an actual-world detectable stimulus is undetectable. However, this doesn't diminish our willingness to attribute knowledge in the case that the stimulus is detectable, even when undetectability would result in the same belief formed in the same way being false. As I will argue at length, the modal account appears unable to accommodate this result.

Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge

“…As we will see shortly, conceptually, there is nothing to stop us from positing cases in which the neural phase effect is moderately stronger than it is in the actual world. Indeed, this is precisely what I have done previously, imaging a counterexample in which, at certain ϕs, Sʼs visual detection threshold was such that S could reliably detect some stimulus and thereby know whether it had been presented, but, at other ϕs, her detection threshold was high enough that her beliefs were scarcely more accurate than chance (Bricker, 2019, section 3). Although such a counterexample is stipulative, going beyond what can be justified by empirical evidence alone, this really is not the point.…”

“…Before I say anything further, it is important to not forget that this neural phase phenomenon has previously been applied to the modal account of epistemic luck (Bricker, 2019), and here I will in no small way follow my previous treatment of the phenomenon. Although I have opted to use a different presentational mode and framing, both the overview of neural phase and the specific case I provide here largely recapitulate content from the 2019 paper (especially sections 3 and 4).…”

“…1 and 4). I would direct the reader to Bricker (2019, section 3) for a narrow, epistemology‐geared introduction to this effect, as well as VanRullen (2016) for a broad, neuroscience‐geared treatment. Although this is quite a complex phenomenon, the key takeaway here is that rapidly, constantly, and outside of our awareness, our ability to detect visual stimuli is fluctuating.…”

“…It provides the empirical foundation required to exacerbate a conceptual breakdown between how we think about knowledge and how we think about distant error. In order to understand this a bit better, let us consider a reframing of something resembling the “Cameron” counterexample (Bricker, 2019, p. 6): First, let us imagine some individual, Charles, with actual‐world properties of ordinary visual perception. For some simple stimulus, say a flash of light, Charles can reliably detect whether the stimulus has been presented.…”

“…In doing so, I will draw heavily from empirical findings provided by cognitive neuroscience that fascinatingly demonstrate that our ordinary perceptual capacities fluctuate with regular, rapid fluctuations in neural phase. Here I will take the case of neural phase, which I have previously discussed as a problem for the modal account of epistemic luck (Bricker, 2019), and provide a detailed appraisal of how these empirical findings pose a structural problem for the intuitive foundations of the modal approach as a whole: The full phase space of these fluctuations, which can be the difference between knowing and cognitive error, is naturally understood as occupying close possible worlds. The revelation of these close possible errors erases any necessary differences between the modal profiles available to known and merely true beliefs that might have been associated with our intuitive picture of human cognition.…”