Neural Mechanisms of Cognitive Dissonance (Revised): An EEG Study

Abstract

Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that our preferences are modulated by the mere act of choosing. A choice between two similarly valued alternatives creates psychological tension (cognitive dissonance) that is reduced by a postdecisional reevaluation of the alternatives. We measured EEG of human subjects during rest and free-choice paradigm. Our study demonstrates that choices associated with stronger cognitive dissonance trigger a larger negative frontocentral evoked response similar to error-related negativity, which has in turn been implicated in general performance monitoring. Furthermore, the amplitude of the evoked response is correlated with the reevaluation of the alternatives. We also found a link between individual neural dynamics (long-range temporal correlations) of the frontocentral cortices during rest and follow-up neural and behavioral effects of cognitive dissonance. Individuals with stronger resting-state long-range temporal correlations demonstrated a greater postdecisional reevaluation of the alternatives and larger evoked brain responses associated with stronger cognitive dissonance. Thus, our results suggest that cognitive dissonance is reflected in both resting-state and choice-related activity of the prefrontal cortex as part of the general performance-monitoring circuitry.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Contrary to traditional decision theory, behavioral studies repeatedly demonstrate that our preferences are modulated by the mere act of choosing. Difficult choices generate psychological (cognitive) dissonance, which is reduced by the postdecisional devaluation of unchosen options. We found that decisions associated with a higher level of cognitive dissonance elicited a stronger negative frontocentral deflection that peaked ∼60 ms after the response. This activity shares similar spatial and temporal features as error-related negativity, the electrophysiological correlate of performance monitoring. Furthermore, the frontocentral resting-state activity predicted the individual magnitude of preference change and the strength of cognitive dissonance-related neural activity.

Integrating prediction errors at two time scales permits rapid recalibration of speech sound categories

“…Overall, these findings are consistent with theories that posit that the brain continuously recalibrates generative (forward) models to maintain self-consistency (e.g., K J Friston et al 2010), and offers a neuro-computationally plausible implementation to resolve cognitive conflicts, which can sometimes appear as irrational behaviors, such as in post-choice re-evaluation of alternatives (Coppin et al 2010;Izuma et al 2010;Colosio et al 2017;Otten, Seth, and Pinto 2017).…”

Choosing what we like vs liking what we choose: How choice-induced preference change might actually be instrumental to decision-making

“…Although compatible with post-choice CIPC, such causal effects can be due to the post-choice disturbance of value representations that resulted from intrachoice CIPC. On the other hand, many recent studies show that brain activity measured during the choice process is predictive of the magnitude of CIPC (Colosio et al, 2017;Jarcho, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2010;Kitayama et al, 2013;van Veen et al, 2009, Voigt et al, 2018.…”

“…Interestingly, recent neuroimaging evidence suggests that, in the context of typical free-choice paradigms, preference changes occur during the decision, not after it (Jarcho, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2010;Colosio et al, 2017). Recall that people are reluctant to make a choice that they are not confident about (De Martino et al, 2013).…”

Нейромеханизмы Изменения Преференций После Принятия Решений

“…By subtracting the mean second rating (rating II) from the mean initial rating (rating I), it is possible to measure the choice-induced preference change. Because Brehm's (1956) free-choice paradigm studies have repeatedly demonstrated that the mere act of choosing between two equally attractive alternatives induces preference change, preferences for the chosen items increases, while preferences for the rejected items decreases (Brehm, 1956;Colosio, Shestakova, Nikulin, Blagovechtchenski, & Klucharev, 2017;Festinger, 1957;Gerard & White, 1983;Izuma et al, 2010). Thus, contrary to normative economic theory, individuals not only behave in accordance with their preferences but also change their preferences to match their previous choices and behavior.…”