Foundational work in the psychology of metacognition identified a distinction between metacognitive knowledge (stable beliefs about one’s capacities) and metacognitive experiences (local evaluations of performance). More recently, the field has focused on the latter half of the construct in the form of confidence estimates, developing tasks and metrics that seek to identify metacognitive capacities from momentary estimates of confidence in performance, and providing precise computational accounts of metacognitive failure. However, progress in formalising models of metacognitive judgments may have come at a cost of ignoring broader elements of the psychology of metacognition – such as how stable meta-knowledge is formed, how social cognition and metacognition interact, and how we evaluate affective states that do not have an obvious ground truth. We propose that construct breadth in metacognition research can be restored while maintaining rigour in measurement (for example, through computational modelling) and highlight promising avenues for extending both temporality and scope in the study of metacognition. Such a research programme is well placed to recapture qualitative features of metacognitive knowledge and experience that were part of the original construct, while maintaining the psychophysical rigor that characterises modern research on confidence and performance monitoring.