Networks, Politics, and Institutions

Moon, Chung‐in; Prasad, Rashemi

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-26330-1_2

Cited by 30 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The features of an individual state that allow it to pursue developmental outcomes may change, yet it is likely that in any particular historical conjuncture states will only be able to pursue certain strategies within the limits of that moment and within the limits of their political and economic structures. This more basic understanding of a developmental state allows for substantial variance, answering some of the criticisms that have been made of the concept of the developmental state and Weberian assumptions about the ideal‐type that do not hold true in either the historical experience of East Asia or in more contemporary applications (Moon & Prasad, , ; Chibber, ; Lim, ; Ohno & Ohno, ).…”

Section: The Developmental State Applied To Angolamentioning

confidence: 99%

State‐led industrial development, structural transformation and elite‐led plunder: Angola (2002–2013) as a developmental state

Ovadia

2018

Development Policy Review

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From 2002 to 2013, Angola engaged in large‐scale state‐led reconstruction and development alongside an elite‐led appropriation and seizure of national assets. Until the oil price shock, Angola had been succeeding in promoting rapid economic growth, and possibly even significant social development, alongside a massive grab of wealth and power by local elites. Today, though an economic crisis has taken hold, frequent predictions of the country's imminent collapse have yet to be fulfilled. This article reviews the state's development planning and expenditure with a focus on public investment and industrial development to determine to what extent Angola during this period might be considered a developmental or petro‐developmental state. It is argued that, while more significant than generally thought, petro‐developmental outcomes were and are limited by the autocratic and neopatrimonial tendencies of the Angolan elite. Nevertheless, limited success with structural transformation may have lasting effects. Following its long civil war, the conditions existed for Angola to follow a new path of state‐led development. Though it may now be more difficult, structural transformation and economic diversification remain the only path to economic and social development.

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Section: The Developmental State Applied To Angolamentioning

confidence: 99%

State‐led industrial development, structural transformation and elite‐led plunder: Angola (2002–2013) as a developmental state

Ovadia

2018

Development Policy Review

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“…13 Prosperity has led to burgeoning corruption in China, Japan, South Korea, and Japan; and in Thailand, the government whose cabinet was widely seen as the "best and the brightest" in the nation's history was overthrown by a military coup in 1991 at least in part because it was also perceived as highly corrupt and interfering with the bureaucracy.14 Finally, as economic policy becomes more complex and the speed of the international product cycle accelerates, "autonomy" evidently becomes a dysfunctional burden for economic decision-makers because government officials simply to not have the expertise to make competent business decisions. That is, a developmental state may be well situated to mobilize the resources for entering the iron and steel industry, but it cannot plot out a coherent strategy for fluxing high tech sectors.…”

Section: / Pacific Focusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regionalization in East Asia: Implications for Critiquing the Developmental State

Clark¹

1995

Pacific Focus

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The East Asian capitalist nations (first Japan and then the four Little Dragons of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) have had the fastest growing economies in the world over the postwar period; during the 1980s China and most of the rest of ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) entered periods of rapid growth; and most recently Vietnam and the Philippines are starting to show signs of economic vitality. East and Southeast Asia's economic success, in turn, stimulated substantial interest in how to explain it; and attention quickly turned to the role of the state. With the exception of Hong Kong, the state intervened in the economy quite extensively throughout the region with the explicit aim of promoting industrialization. Since these economies responded with rapid growth and economic transformation, it was not only a short step of induction to conclude that state leadership was a major (and probably the key) factor explaining the superior economic performance that was observed in East and Southeast Asia. This also fit nicely with an emerging school in the political economy of development for "bringing the state back in" which harkened back to earlier arguments about the need for state leadership to mobilize resources in "late developers.

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Unravelling an East Asian Puzzle

2020

The Political Economy of Developmental States in East Asia

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Networks, Politics, and Institutions

Cited by 30 publications

References 0 publications

State‐led industrial development, structural transformation and elite‐led plunder: Angola (2002–2013) as a developmental state

State‐led industrial development, structural transformation and elite‐led plunder: Angola (2002–2013) as a developmental state

Regionalization in East Asia: Implications for Critiquing the Developmental State

Unravelling an East Asian Puzzle

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