Network routing for insurgency: An adversarial risk analysis framework

Abstract

Problems in counterterrorism and corporate competition have prompted research that attempts to combine statistical risk analysis with game theory in ways that support practical decision making. This article applies these methods of adversarial risk analysis to the problem of selecting a route through a network in which an opponent chooses vertices for ambush. The motivating application is convoy routing across a road network when there may be improvised explosive devices and imperfect intelligence about their locations.

Adversarial risk analysis: Borel games

“…Rios Insua, Rios, and Banks [1] apply it to an auction problem. And Wang and Banks [26] apply ARA to the problem of routing convoys through a city in which there may be improvised explosive devices. In both cases, the essential step is to build a model for the the decision processes of one's opponent, and then use subjective probability distributions to describe all unknown quantities.…”

Game‐Theoretic Computing in Cyber‐Risk

“…Recently, problems in counterterrorism and corporate competition have prompted applied research that attempts to combine math-statistical risk analysis with game theory in ways that support practical decision making. Wang and Bank's latest article applies these methods of ARA to the problem of selecting a route through a network, in which an opponent chooses certain vertices for ambush [47].…”

Modeling Opponents in Adversarial Risk Analysis

“…Daphne does not know the elements (u A , p A (· | ·), p A ) required to solve Equation (2). As a Bayesian, she expresses her uncertainty about these through random utilities and probabilities (U A , P A (· | ·), P A ).…”

“…r As sketched in Section 3.2., the Nash equilibrium opponent model requires elements (1,1), (1,3), (1,2), and (1,5), which are used to calculate (0,4).…”