Network Formation Games in Cooperative MIMO Interference Systems

Zhou, Tong; Chen, Yan; Liu, K. J. Ray

doi:10.1109/twc.2013.113013.131602

Cited by 13 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(41 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A deviation in which a user leaves a coalition and joins another if this improves his payoff leads to Nash stability [28] and has been used in [29] in the context of channel sensing and access in cognitive radio. In [30], individual stability which is a weaker stability concept than Nash stability is used for coalitional games in the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) interference channel. A coalition of links cooperate by performing ZF to each other.…”

Section: B Applications Of Coalitional Games In Partition Formmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Simulation results reveal the tradeoff between coalition formation complexity and the obtained performance of the links. In addition, we compare our algorithm regarding complexity and performance to the algorithms in [26] and [30].…”

Section: Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The motivation for this model is as follows: the overhead required for the utility comparison and communication with the members of T should make coalition merging more attractive. Later in (29) and (30) in Section V, we specify two different overhead models for performance comparison. According to (22), the notation C 0 ≺ T C 1 means that each player in T prefers the coalition structure C 1 to C 0 .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Coalitional Games in MISO Interference Channels: Epsilon-Core and Coalition Structure Stable Set

Mochaourab¹,

Jorswieck

2014

IEEE Trans. Signal Process.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-The multiple-input single-output interference channel is considered. Each transmitter is assumed to know the channels between itself and all receivers perfectly and the receivers are assumed to treat interference as additive noise. In this setting, noncooperative transmission does not take into account the interference generated at other receivers which generally leads to inefficient performance of the links. To improve this situation, we study cooperation between the links using coalitional games. The players (links) in a coalition either perform zero forcing transmission or Wiener filter precoding to each other. The ǫ-core is a solution concept for coalitional games which takes into account the overhead required in coalition deviation. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the strong and weak ǫ-core of our coalitional game not to be empty with zero forcing transmission. Since, the ǫ-core only considers the possibility of joint cooperation of all links, we study coalitional games in partition form in which several distinct coalitions can form. We propose a polynomial time distributed coalition formation algorithm based on coalition merging and prove that its solution lies in the coalition structure stable set of our coalition formation game. Simulation results reveal the cooperation gains for different coalition formation complexities and deviation overhead models.

show abstract

Section: B Applications Of Coalitional Games In Partition Formmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Coalitional Games in MISO Interference Channels: Epsilon-Core and Coalition Structure Stable Set

Mochaourab¹,

Jorswieck

2014

IEEE Trans. Signal Process.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…6 Another way to ensure convergence of the considered coalition formation algorithm is by associating with each player a history set which is utilized to prevent the player from joining a coalition it has been a member of before, as in e.g. [19], [21], [32], [33].…”

Section: A Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, individual-based stability can be considered to be more restrictive than group-based stability in the deviation model and hence is generally of less complexity. Such stability concepts have been applied in [19] in the context of cooperative channel sensing and access in cognitive radio and in [21] for cooperative precoding in the MIMO interference channel.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptive Pilot Clustering in Heterogeneous Massive MIMO Networks

Mochaourab

Björnson

Bengtsson

2016

IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider the uplink of a cellular massive MIMO network. Acquiring channel state information at the base stations (BSs) requires uplink pilot signaling. Since the number of orthogonal pilot sequences is limited by the channel coherence, pilot reuse across cells is necessary to achieve high spectral efficiency. However, finding efficient pilot reuse patterns is non-trivial especially in practical asymmetric BS deployments. We approach this problem using coalitional game theory. Each BS has a few unique pilots and can form coalitions with other BSs to gain access to more pilots. The BSs in a coalition thus benefit from serving more users in their cells, at the expense of higher pilot contamination and interference. Given that a cell's average spectral efficiency depends on the overall pilot reuse pattern, the suitable coalitional game model is in partition form. We develop a low-complexity distributed coalition formation based on individual stability. By incorporating a base station intercommunication budget constraint, we are able to control the overhead in message exchange between the base stations and ensure the algorithm's convergence to a solution of the game called individually stable coalition structure. Simulation results reveal fast algorithmic convergence and substantial performance gains over the baseline schemes with no pilot reuse, full pilot reuse, or random pilot reuse pattern.Comment: IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 13 pages, 13 figures, 2 table

show abstract

A coalitional game scheme for cooperative interference management in cloud radio access networks

Sun

Peng

Zhang

et al. 2014

Trans. Emerging. Tel. Tech.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Cloud radio access networks (C‐RANs) are promising technological paradigms to improve capacity and extend coverage. However, the severe interference resulting from high density deployment of remote radio heads (RRHs) prevents to achieve high spectrum efficiency. How to mitigate the interference is a key challenging work. This paper investigates the cooperative interference management among RRHs in C‐RANs. By forming coalitions and performing non‐coherent joint transmission within a coalition, the intra‐coalition interference among RRHs can be successfully suppressed. Considering that RRHs are selfish and rational, in this paper, the cooperation of RRHs is formulated as a coalition formation game scheme, where the necessary conditions for an RRH to cooperate are derived. To find the solution for the proposed game, an enhanced concept of defection order is proposed, based on which a self‐optimal coalition formation algorithm is proposed. The performances of the proposed algorithm, in terms of convergence, complexity and fairness, are analysed as well. Simulation results show that our proposed algorithm yields significant improvements of system performance compared with both the non‐cooperative scheme and the conventional broadcasting‐based coalitional scheme.Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

show abstract

Network Formation Games in Cooperative MIMO Interference Systems

Cited by 13 publications

References 32 publications

Coalitional Games in MISO Interference Channels: Epsilon-Core and Coalition Structure Stable Set

Coalitional Games in MISO Interference Channels: Epsilon-Core and Coalition Structure Stable Set

Adaptive Pilot Clustering in Heterogeneous Massive MIMO Networks

A coalitional game scheme for cooperative interference management in cloud radio access networks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About