Network capacity management under competition

Jiang, Houyuan; Pang, Zhan

doi:10.1007/s10589-010-9340-8

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…But GNEPs have also been employed to model more technical problems that do not fit any of the categories listed above, and it just seems likely that now that the model is winning more and more popularity, many other applications will be uncovered in the near future. It is impossible to list here all relevant references for these applications; we limit ourselves to a few that, in our view, are either particularly interesting or good entry points to the literature Perakis 2006a, 2006b;Altman and Wynter 2004;Arrow and Debreu 1954;Başar and Olsder 1989;Bassanini et al 2002;Breton et al 2005;Contreras et al 2004;Ehrenmann 2004;Gabriel et al 2005;Gabriel and Smeers 2006;Harker 1991;Harker and Hong 1994;Haurie and Krawczyk 1997;Hobbs et al 2001;Hobbs and Pang 2007;Jiang 2007;Kesselman et al 2005;Krawczyk 2000Krawczyk , 2007Outrata et al 1998;Pang et al 2008;Pang et al 2009;Puerto et al 2005;Scutari et al 2009;Sun and Gao 2007;Tidball and Zaccour 2005;Wei and Smeers 1999;Zhou et al 2005). We finally mention that the very recent reference ) presents a rather comprehensive and sophisticated treatment of the GNEP based on a variational inequality approach that allows to establish some interesting new results.…”

Section: Historical Overview and Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

2009

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Section: Historical Overview and Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

2009

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“…Netessine and Shumsky (2005) examine one-shot, quantity-based RM duopoly games of setting booking limit controls under both horizontal and vertical competition. Jiang and Pang (2011) study an oligopolistic version in a network RM setting. These works ignore firms' intertemporal interactions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Assets Under Competition

Gallego

2014

Management Science

144

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W e study dynamic price competition in an oligopolistic market with a mix of substitutable and complementary perishable assets. Each firm has a fixed initial stock of items and competes in setting prices to sell them over a finite sales horizon. Customers sequentially arrive at the market, make a purchase choice, and then leave immediately with some likelihood of no purchase. The purchase likelihood depends on the time of purchase, product attributes, and current prices. The demand structure includes time-variant linear and multinomial logit demand models as special cases. Assuming deterministic customer arrival rates, we show that any equilibrium strategy has a simple structure, involving a finite set of shadow prices measuring capacity externalities that firms exert on each other: equilibrium prices can be solved from a one-shot price competition game under the current-time demand structure, taking into account capacity externalities through the time-invariant shadow prices. The former reflects the transient demand side at every moment, and the latter captures the aggregate supply constraints over the sales horizon. This simple structure sheds light on dynamic revenue management problems under competition, which helps capture the essence of the problems under demand uncertainty. We show that the equilibrium solutions from the deterministic game provide precommitted and contingent heuristic policies that are asymptotic equilibria for its stochastic counterpart, when demand and supply are sufficiently large.

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“…Deciding on alignment with Nash equilibrium allows the players to avoid indirect network effects which can hurt them. The knowledge that a unique Nash equilibrium exists has practical utility as firms can pursue a clear decision path [ 39 ]. However, even if the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium is questionable, computing a Nash equilibrium is useful in understanding the competitive game at play.…”

Section: Solution Algorithm and Model Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

More buyers or more sellers: on marketing resource allocation strategies of competing two-sided platforms

Bardhan

Ashraf

2022

Electron Commer Res

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Two-sided platforms enable and supplement transactions between buyers and sellers. We consider a decision problem facing two such platform firms competing in a market. Each firm needs to divide its budget of a planning period between promotion towards attracting new sellers and new buyers. We propose a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) model to find optimal allocations. The GNEP approach provides an eloquent framework for analysis and theory development. An intuitive result from the interpretation of optimality conditions is that a firm’s focus should be higher towards the group whose presence is less on the platform. This focus can shift depending on competitors’ ability to dissuade new customers. Interestingly, the model recommends that a firm should focus on getting new sellers when its customer-focused promotion adversely impacts competitors’ customer acquisition. Predatory promotion strategy adversely affects both. More useful implications can be drawn from the equilibrium analysis. We have assumed that a limited number of sellers are available in the market, whereas no restrictions are imposed on new customer acquisitions. This situation is typical during the entry phase of a two-sided platform.

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Network capacity management under competition

Abstract: Revenue management, Capacity control, Generalized Nash games, Existence, Uniqueness,

Cited by 12 publications

References 42 publications

Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Assets Under Competition

More buyers or more sellers: on marketing resource allocation strategies of competing two-sided platforms

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