Network-based multidimensional moving target defense against false data injection attack in power system

Hu, Yifan; Xun, Peng; Zhu, Peidong; Xiong, Yinqiao; Zhu, Yufan; Shi, Weiheng; Hu, Chenxi

doi:10.1016/j.cose.2021.102283

Cited by 13 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…These types of attacks are hazardous as they can have catastrophic consequences to the system. From the literature, it has been observed that the untrusted input is given in the form of control logic, 57 command, 18,58 false data [58][59][60][61] and time delay 62 to the ICS. Majorly researchers focussed on false data injections as they are more severe and can occur in multiple ways.…”

Section: Injection Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A systematic literature review on past attack analysis on industrial control systems

Goel

2024

Trans Emerging Tel Tech

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Industrial control systems are used to automate the monitoring and control of physical processes in large‐scale industries and critical infrastructure such as power plants, chemical treatment plants, manufacturing, and assembly line processes. Securing industrial control systems is important for the uninterrupted operation of these infrastructures, which are highly interconnected and becoming the prime target of attackers because disrupting these systems can have significant economic and safety implications and consequences such as power outages, environmental disasters, production shutdowns, or even physical harm. The past review works have discussed industrial control systems attacks, their impact, and exploited vulnerabilities separately and lack comprehension. In this work, an attempt has been made to understand the comprehensive picture of vulnerabilities, attacks, and their impact on industrial control systems. Past reviews published between 2014 and 2023 have been studied following a systematic literature review process, and a taxonomy and categorization of past attacks and defense mechanisms have been proposed and classified minutely for readers' interest. Vulnerabilities at the architecture, hardware, software, and communication network level have also been studied and presented. A deep understanding of past attacks, their impact, and identified potential causes is among the major contributions of this review. The results will enable researchers working in academics and industry to make effective decisions on safeguarding the industrial control systems against future attacks.

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Section: Injection Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A systematic literature review on past attack analysis on industrial control systems

Goel

2024

Trans Emerging Tel Tech

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“…Traditional defense techniques, such as firewalls and intrusion detection techniques [2,3], typically rely on known attack signatures to identify and match target behaviors, leaving them at a disadvantage against unknown vulnerabilities and backdoors in cyber warfare. A series of novel proactive defense technologies are proposed to address this issue, such as honeypots [4] and Moving Target Defense (MTD) [5][6][7]. These methods effectively improved the situation and significantly increased the difficulty and cost for attackers to launch their attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Location-Aware Measurement for Cyber Mimic Defense: You Cannot Improve What You Cannot Measure

Huang,

Yuan,

et al. 2023

Applied Sciences

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Cyber mimic defense is designed to ensure endogenous security, effectively countering unknown vulnerabilities and backdoors, thereby addressing a significant challenge in cyberspace. However, the immense scale of real-world networks and their intricate topology pose challenges for measuring the efficacy of cyber mimic defense. To capture and quantify defense performance within specific segments of these expansive networks, we embrace a partitioning approach that subdivides large networks into smaller regions. Metrics are then established within an objective space constructed on these smaller regions. This approach enables the establishment of several fine-grained metrics that offer a more nuanced measurement of cyber mimic defense deployed in complex networks. For example, the common-mode index is introduced to highlight shared vulnerabilities among diverse nodes, the transfer probability computes the likelihood of risk propagation among nodes, and the failure risk assesses the likelihood of cyber mimic defense technology failure within individual nodes or entire communities. Furthermore, we provide proof of the convergence of the transfer probability. A multitude of simulations are conducted to validate the reliability and applicability of the proposed metrics.

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“…Meanwhile, injection attacks are received a lot of attention from academics. [13][14][15][16][17][18] Considering CPSs under false data injection attacks, a new types of Nussbaum functions are introduced in the adaptive control. 13 The problem of adaptive NN finite time resilient control is investigated for nonlinear time-delay system with actuator fault and injection attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Meanwhile, injection attacks are received a lot of attention from academics 13‐18 . Considering CPSs under false data injection attacks, a new types of Nussbaum functions are introduced in the adaptive control 13 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The problem of adaptive NN finite time resilient control is investigated for nonlinear time‐delay system with actuator fault and injection attacks 14 . A network‐based multidimensional moving target defense mechanism for power system underfalse data injection attacks in Reference 17. The authors discuss the characteristics of injection attacks including not only the goals, construction methods and consequences of from the perspective of attackers but also the protection and detection countermeasures from the perspective of defenders in Reference 18.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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NN‐based decentralized adaptive event‐triggered control for nonlinear interconnected systems under intermittent DoS and injection attacks

Cui

Sun

Hou

2022

Adaptive Control & Signal

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Summary This article investigates the problem of decentralized adaptive neural network event‐triggered control of strict feedback nonlinear interconnected systems suffering injection attacks and intermittent denial‐of‐service (DoS) attacks. When DoS attacks occur, the sensor‐controller communication channel is jammed. This may result in system states and traditional backstepping methods are unavailable. A novel switching‐type state observer is constructed to overcome the aforementioned challenges. When the injection attacks occur, the input signals of the controller‐actuator communication channel are changed. A decentralized adaptive event‐triggered controller is designed by using the backstepping method, where a first‐order sliding mode differentiator is introduced to avoid “computational explosion.” The observer gain is derived via the linear matrix inequality technique simultaneously. By using an improved average dwell time method and Lyapunov function theory, all closed‐loop signals are bounded. Finally, a numerical example is used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed control scheme.

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Network-based multidimensional moving target defense against false data injection attack in power system

Cited by 13 publications

References 19 publications

A systematic literature review on past attack analysis on industrial control systems

A systematic literature review on past attack analysis on industrial control systems

Location-Aware Measurement for Cyber Mimic Defense: You Cannot Improve What You Cannot Measure

NN‐based decentralized adaptive event‐triggered control for nonlinear interconnected systems under intermittent DoS and injection attacks

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