Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms

Kourandi, Frago; Valletti, Tommaso

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2061571

Cited by 19 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…This is a specific manifestation of the argument put forth by proponents of net neutrality regulation that consumer preferences would not adequately reflect the importance of application innovation [Lessig 2001; van Schewick 2010]: it is not that consumers do not care at all about less popular or established applications, but that they do not care enough to switch their ISP over them. These findings also comport with a number of formal economic models that show that discriminatory regimes can harm niche applications and their users while benefitting large, established providers and their users [Bourreau et al 2013;Guo et al 2012;Reggiani and Valletti 2012].…”

Section: Secondary Role Of Traffic Management In Switching Decisionssupporting

confidence: 58%

Net Neutrality

Cooper

Brown

2015

ACM Trans. Internet Technol.

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We analyze UK and US experiences as they relate to two central net neutrality questions: (1) whether competition serves as a deterrent to the discriminatory treatment of Internet traffic, and (2) whether discrimination creates barriers to application development and innovation. Relying on consumer switching behavior to provide more comprehensive competitive discipline was insufficient for a variety of reasons, including the presence of switching costs. The process of correcting errors in the technology used for application-specific management revealed that such management creates costs for application developers and innovators, regardless of whether their products are targeted for traffic management.

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Section: Secondary Role Of Traffic Management In Switching Decisionssupporting

confidence: 58%

Net Neutrality

Cooper

Brown

2015

ACM Trans. Internet Technol.

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“…Otherwise, when the CP competes for customers'clicks with the other CP, the advertisement rate is low. 4 Since we are particularly interested in how the level of competition between CPs a¤ects Internet fragmentation, we de…ne a r H =r L . This parameter a 1 plays an important role in our analysis.…”

Section: A Model Of Competing Isps and Cpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Net Neutrality, Exclusivity Contracts, and Internet Fragmentation

Kourandi

Krämer

Valletti

2015

Information Systems Research

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Net neutrality is believed to prevent Internet fragmentation. We examine the relationship between net neutrality regulation and Internet fragmentation in a game-theoretic model that considers the interplay between termination fees, exclusivity and competition between two Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and between two Content Providers (CPs). An exclusivity arrangement between an ISP and a CP reduces the CP's exposure to some end users but it also reduces competition among the CPs. Fragmentation arises in equilibrium when competition between CPs is very strong, the CPs'revenues from advertisements are very low, the content of the CPs is highly complementary, or the termination fees are high. We …nd that the absence of fragmentation is always bene…cial for consumers, as they can enjoy all available content. Policy interventions that prevent fragmentation are thus good for consumers. However, results for total welfare are more mixed. A zero-price rule on tra¢ c termination is neither a su¢ cient nor a necessary policy instrument to prevent fragmentation. In fact, regulatory interventions may be ine¤ective or even detrimental to welfare and are only warranted under special circumstances.Keywords: Net neutrality; Internet fragmentation; Exclusivity. JEL Codes: L13; L51; L52; L96.We thank Marc Bourreau, Bruno Jullien and Thibaud Vergé for very useful discussions and comments.

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“…However, they disagree on how a two-sided model would impact innovation and investment in on-line services and on how a two-sided model would affect end users of on-line services. For example, Bourreau, Kourandi, and Valletti (2015) posit that under discrimination, the incentive to fund and develop broadband capacity and content innovation are higher in free markets with no open Internet regulatory interventions than under a neutral network regime. The underlying assumption is that the two-sided market among CPs and ISPs is sufficiently large.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Institutional Analysis of TMP Regulation in India

Menon

2021

Review of Policy Research

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This study identifies the main actors in the Indian network neutrality case and explores the main formal and informal institutional arrangements that constrain and influence their agendas for traffic management practices (TMPs). The analysis applies institutional analysis to this subject matter. This study identifies the formal institutional arrangements such as licenses for ISPs and informal institutional arrangements manifesting in practices to block websites and applications, throttle this content, and engage in preferential treatment.

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Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms

Cited by 19 publications

References 15 publications

Net Neutrality

Net Neutrality

Net Neutrality, Exclusivity Contracts, and Internet Fragmentation

An Institutional Analysis of TMP Regulation in India

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