2014
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2431952
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Neoliberalism in Australia and the Henry Tax Review

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…These barriers include political sensitivities (Evans 2011), the influence of powerful lobby groups in defence of the policy status quo (Gurran and Phibbs 2016), and prevailing cultural norms (Blunden 2016;Khoury 2015;Marriott 2010;Passant 2014;Worthington 2012). Their effect is reinforced by the financial relationship between the Australian Government and the states (Eccleston, Woolley et al 2013;Eccleston and Smith 2015;Smith 2012;Warren 2010;, and deeply institutionalised relationships between major political parties and commercial interests which corrode capacity to implement reform proposals (Eccleston and Marsh 2011).…”
Section: 12mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These barriers include political sensitivities (Evans 2011), the influence of powerful lobby groups in defence of the policy status quo (Gurran and Phibbs 2016), and prevailing cultural norms (Blunden 2016;Khoury 2015;Marriott 2010;Passant 2014;Worthington 2012). Their effect is reinforced by the financial relationship between the Australian Government and the states (Eccleston, Woolley et al 2013;Eccleston and Smith 2015;Smith 2012;Warren 2010;, and deeply institutionalised relationships between major political parties and commercial interests which corrode capacity to implement reform proposals (Eccleston and Marsh 2011).…”
Section: 12mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, given the considerable political sensitivities associated with housing-related tax policy (Evans 2011), a number of powerful lobby groups advocate in favour of the policy status quo (Gurran and Phibbs 2016) and the prevailing paradigm and cultural norms that structure the discourse of tax reform (Blunden 2016;Khoury 2015;Marriott 2010;Passant 2014;Worthington 2012). These dynamics have historically been reinforced by institutionalised relations between major political parties and commercial interests which corrode institutional capacity to implement reform proposals (Eccleston and Marsh 2011).…”
Section: Intergovernmental Coordinationmentioning
confidence: 99%