2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.eist.2017.04.001
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Neoliberalism and the legality of peer platform markets

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Cited by 21 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…22.7% [35][36][37] Institution and governance system Proposals for implementation of regulation and laws; analysis of matters of ethics and labor; discussion on asymmetric power relationships 18.7% [38][39][40]…”
Section: User Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…22.7% [35][36][37] Institution and governance system Proposals for implementation of regulation and laws; analysis of matters of ethics and labor; discussion on asymmetric power relationships 18.7% [38][39][40]…”
Section: User Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Studies reveal disagreement in aspects ranging from relationships with the market, government, workers, consumers (users), to sustainability and environmental issues (Murillo, Buckland, & Val, 2017). The assumption taken for granted, as far as digital platforms are concerned, is that there should be minimum state interference in the market, i.e., the neoliberal idea of the less regulated the market, the wider the benefits to shareholders (McKee, 2017). This is inherent in the way corporations such as Uber are replacing current jobs with precarious gigs that lack protection and legal benefits (Zwick, 2018).…”
Section: Se Arguments (Still) Unlikely To Agreementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is inherent in the way corporations such as Uber are replacing current jobs with precarious gigs that lack protection and legal benefits (Zwick, 2018). It turns out, advocate McKee (2017), that such platforms ended up being the result of self-regulated rules adopted by SE's new models and state regulatory laws. The logic of an inclusive and empowering job is still not clear and brings instability and tension: the most influential and powerful SE firms are private and profit-driven but still not as taxed and regulated as the traditional ones (Laurell & Sandström, 2017).…”
Section: Se Arguments (Still) Unlikely To Agreementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Immers, de platformen worden doorgaans ontwikkeld en beheerd door een (op winst georiënteerd) bedrijf, maar hun dienst bestaat eruit dat zij een marktplaats organiseren waarop burgers goederen en diensten kunnen aanbieden en afnemen. Deze markt is evenwel geen vrije markt, omdat het platform kan bepalen wie mag participeren op het platform (McKee, 2017). Daarbij stelt het platform zich op als (zelf-)regulerende instantie die mensen weert die zich in de ogen van de platformbeheerder niet kwalificeren als voldoende kundig of sociaal (bijvoorbeeld blijkens negatieve reviews of klachten die tot het platform worden gericht).…”
Section: Deeleconomie En Kluseconomieunclassified
“…Platformen zijn evenzeer een institutionele innovatie. Het platform fungeert namelijk niet alleen als algoritmisch intermediair, maar als ook als een private toezichthouder (McKee, 2017). Door online gedragingen van gebruikers te registeren en offline gedragingen te laten beoordelen door peers, houdt het platform zicht op uitwassen en wanprestaties.…”
Section: Platforminnovatie In Historisch Perspectiefunclassified