Neoliberal Penality and State Legitimacy: Politics of Amnesty in Turkey during the AKP Period

Abstract

General amnesty is an extraordinary policy mostly used in the aftermath of civil wars or regime transition to maintain political stability. In Turkey, however, amnesties have historically been used to resolve the chronic problems of the criminal justice system. This radically changed after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, which has taken a sharp anti‐amnesty position. This shift should be understood as part of AKP's neoliberal orientation in criminal justice policies that has increased the dose of punitiveness, emphasized individual responsibility of offenders, and enhanced the organizational efficiency of institutions. Central to this neoliberal penal orientation is the party's neopopulist ideology constructed on an image of a strong state that (i) is capable of dealing with structural problems without having to recourse to extraordinary measures, (ii) no longer sees criminals as “victims of fate”, (iii) prioritizes victims’ rights. Our analysis contributes to the mounting literature on neoliberal penalty in two ways: first is by bringing the question of why states forgive at center stage when most work focuses exclusively on how and why states punish; second is by paying closer attention to how developing country governments with limited financial, logistical, and administrative resources manage the tensions and contradictions that neoliberal penal policies bring forth. Our arguments are based on official reports; in‐depth interviews with legal professionals; and descriptive statistics on the criminal justice system.

Insult, Charisma, and Legitimacy: Turkey's Transition to Personalist Rule

“…On July 29, 2016, following the coup attempt of July 15, Erdoğan declared that he pardoned “ all those who engaged in all kinds of disrespectful behaviour towards [his] personality” and withdrew all existing cases through this a one-time-only amnesty. In Turkey, governments traditionally saw amnesty as an “emergency button” against the clogging of the system (Kocasakal, 2010) and used it as a mechanism in dealing with the overburdened criminal justice system and overcrowded prisons (Yıldırım and Kuyucu, 2017). In fact, with 157 amnesties since 1923, 11 of which were general amnesties, the country tops the world in the number of amnesties passed (Ankara Chamber of Commerce, 2004, Cengiz and Gazialem, 2000).…”

“…In fact, with 157 amnesties since 1923, 11 of which were general amnesties, the country tops the world in the number of amnesties passed (Ankara Chamber of Commerce, 2004, Cengiz and Gazialem, 2000). After 2002, however, despite the drastic increase in the prison population, the AKP government strongly rejected amnesty in alleviating structural problems in the judiciary (Yıldırım and Kuyucu, 2017). Leading party members have repeatedly claimed that the state will no longer grant amnesty to criminals and that a new general amnesty is entirely out of the question.…”

“…AKP's approach stressed that the state can only “pardon” offences committed against itself—political crimes–and should not interfere when the criminal act concerns another person's right to life or property. Scholars have interpreted this shift in policy as an indication of the end of the paternalistic state that forgives unfortunate citizens pushed to crime and of its replacement with an authoritarian retributive state that can effectively deal with a crime without recourse to extraordinary measures and therefore refuses to forgive offenders (Yıldırım and Kuyucu, 2017).…”

“…The decision to pardon is ultimately related to how a government seeks legitimacy. It gives the ruler enormous power in increasing its acceptance among specific constituencies (Yıldırım and Kuyucu, 2017). Especially during times of intense internal conflict and strife, states that are unable to pacify opponents can grant amnesty to those convicted from the opponent group to make coexistence with these groups possible.…”