Neoliberal Environmentalism, Climate Interventionism and the Trade-Climate Nexus

Abstract

Trade has become an increasingly core part and defining feature of our globalising world economy, and so by default has become integrally linked to climate change and action. Trade has not only rapidly expanded over recent decades but also driven contemporary economic development and growth, especially in countries where carbon and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have too risen sharply. Increasing attention has consequently been afforded to the nexus between trade and climate change. Trade is now a key front for climate action. For some time, neoliberal environmentalism has been viewed as the dominant discourse on climate policy and other aspects of environmental governance. However, it has been very rarely applied to, or its relevance tested against the trade-climate nexus specifically. The paper presents a study on this relationship based on new original empirical research and the investigation of the following hypotheses or research questions. To what extent has neoliberal environmentalism thus far dominated mainstream international and global discourses on trade-linked efforts on climate action? What have been the principal features of neoliberal environmentalism within these discourses? Do the results of the study’s empirical research suggest the need to include other relevant analytical approaches to develop a better comprehension of how trade-climate nexus issues are being addressed? In addressing the above the paper develops an analytical framework comprises modelled normative elements of neoliberal environmentalism as well as relevant concepts of state-market relations. This frames the discursive evaluation of the study’s research that is based on a multi-stage, in-depth text analysis of 37 key publications produced by global economic institutions (GEIs) on the trade-climate nexus from 2007 to 2022. Market-based instruments (MBIs) were found to be by far the strongest normative element in this text corpus. This subsequently provided scope for exploring whether different forms of ‘climate interventionism’ were evident in the trade-climate nexus, and thus more nuanced and alternative understandings of the subject. The paper’s main contribution to the literature on this subject is to open up ideas and debate concerning how important aspects of neoliberal environmentalism overlap with, and can be better understood in the context of state-market relations. Evidence from this study’s research suggests that in the trade-climate nexus discourse there exists considerable space for states and international institutions to adopt, promote and innovate different forms of climate interventionism through various trade policy and governance actions. It is further argued that MBI-based trade related policies can only take us so far in climate action efforts. More ardent forms of state and other institutional interventions, from the local to the global-international levels, are required to ultimately achieve increasingly urgent climate goals.

Climate Activism, Sovereignty, and the Role of States: Envisioning Post-Liberal Climate Governance

“…Meanwhile, in their ambivalence on the desired role of state and top-down measures, as well as with their initial transnational scope, climate movements might have inadvertently reinforced so-called "neoliberal environmentalism" (Dent 2022), a three-decades-long trend in GCG which systematically favored de-politicizing market-based solutions, privatization of resource control, commodification of resources, withdrawal of direct government intervention, decentralization of resource governance to local authorities and NGOs (Dent 2022), and an emphasis on an eco-consumeristic ethic (Stoner 2020). Despite some relatively successful parenthesis of national levelbased climate campaigns in the 2010s -such as the UK's "golden age" of climate activism and policymaking (Nulman 2015, 24 -56) -not much changed in the agendas of the movements until COP21, when scholars "increasingly saw climate activists reject any possibility of the UNFCCC solving the climate crisis" (Doherty et al 2018).…”

“…2 We ought to conclude that, despite signs of change, the ambiguity of the climate movements concerning the desired role of the state is yet not gone. On the other hand, despite some recent signs of a post-neoliberal, pro-(nation)-state turn (Dent 2022;Brad et al 2022), among GEIs' reports and current national and regional climate policymaking the ambivalence persists as well. 3 Over the last few years, different varieties of the "Green New Deal" have gained momentum among scholars, civil society, and policymakers (Brad et al 2022), inevitably contributing to the revitalization of the discussion about the desired role of states in GCG and the pros and cons of top-down and bottom-up measures.…”

“…Moreover, a problematic lack of distinction between "public" and "private" domains across multiple domains was highlighted (Sassen 1996), comprising global environmental governance (Pattberg -Stripple 2008;Vatn 2018). Transnational free-trade agreements and GEIs have been widely highlighted as the locus of most crucial tension between free-trade economic growth and environmental protection, undermining the attempts of nation-states to promote radical environmental protection measures (Klein 2014;Ajl 2021;Dent 2022) as well as conflicting with UNFCCC and UNEP (Bierman 2014). Concerning developing countries, scholars have stressed the importance of claiming effective state sovereignty and rejecting unfair climate agreements as a rejection of Western neo-imperialist "green" projects which do not satisfy the basic requirements of climate justiceconsidering, for example, the disproportion of historic GHG emissions and the uneven distribution of financial and administrative capabilities across developing and developed states (Eckersley 2004, 232), as explicitly stated at the Cochabamba World People's Conference on Climate Change in 2010.…”

“…Under overly free markets and strong free trade and investment agreements worldwide, Mariana Mazzucato argues, the world economy follows a pathdependent direction that, in the case of climate change, locks us in catastrophic fossilbased inertia (Mazzucato 2015, 6). The view that states are best suited to guide climate action and people's lifestyles (IEA 2022) is increasingly popular in the GEIs' reports (Dent 2022). In this view, states "can lead the way by providing the strategic vision, the spur to innovation, the incentives for consumers, the policy signals and the public finance that catalyzes private investment" (IEA 2022, 26), while simultaneously supporting most affected communities and -crucially -bearing "the responsibility to avoid unintended consequences for the security and affordability of supply" (IEA 2022, 26, emphasis added).…”

“…On the one hand, scholars have reported traces of a "statist" turn in the agendas of some of the most relevant climate movements, such as FFF and ER (Doherty et al 2018;de Moor et al 2021), hence partially breaking with a longstanding tradition of ambivalence concerning the desired role of states among environmental activism and green parties (Eckersley 2004, 11) and a past commitment to lobbying the international arena rather than national governments (Doherty et al 2018). On the other hand, evidence suggests that GEIs are increasingly starting to question their three-decade-long support of the "neoliberal" governance model (Dent 2022;Brad et al 2022) and look more favorably at the role of states and governments in managing the transition. For example, the IEA has recently declared in a report that "it is for governments to take the lead and show the way" in the transition process (IEA 2022, 26).…”