Neo-patrimonialism, Institutions and Economic Growth: The Case of Malawi, 1964-2009

Abstract

For significant periods Malawi's economy has performed as well or better than might have been expected given its geographical location and natural resource endowments. Underlying these promising episodes is a pattern of centralised, long‐horizon rent management and technocratic integrity. This case study of ‘developmental patrimonialism’ found that the period 1965–79 was one of centralised, long‐horizon rent management and a vertically disciplined technocracy, and the economy grew healthily; 1980–94, by contrast, was a period in which rent management drifted. Although it remained quite centralised, it became geared more to the short term, while the civil service began to deteriorate as it was politicised. These resulted in a comparatively directionless reform programme. The situation deteriorated still further under President Bakili Muluzi (1994–2004). This was a period of decentralised, short‐horizon rent management and a further deterioration of the state bureaucracy. The economy entered a tailspin. A recovery was made during the first term of President Bingu wa Mutharika (2004–09), who reintroduced some aspects of long‐horizon rent centralisation and promoted a more vertically disciplined technocracy.

Working with the Grain and Swimming against the Tide

“…Our research (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011;Cammack and Kelsall 2011;Kelsall 2011) is leading us to emphasize the relevance of differences between more developmental and less developmental forms of neopatrimonial regime. We think this can be explained theoretically and is well grounded in historical experience in both Asia and Africa.…”

Developmental States: A Review of the Literature

“…The developmental outcomes are often lost at point of leadership change or in the case of the leader's waning capacities (Cammack and Kelsall 2011). This is perhaps one of the major problematic elements of patrimonial developmental states.…”

“…In particular the importance of the civil service especially in terms of its professionalism and its capacity emerges from some of their work. For example they discuss Kenya's autonomous bureaucracy (Kelsall and Booth 2010, p.19) and also the professionalism of the bureaucracy during the first period of Banda's rule in Malawi (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011). Cammack and Kelsall's description of the civil service in the Malawian case in particular reflects many of the qualities ascribed to the bureaucracy in developmental states.…”

“…They examine a number of case studies of states whose forms of patrimonialism can be seen to have had positive developmental impacts. (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2011;Cammack and Kelsall, 2011;Kelsall and Booth, 2010) Clientelism and patrimonialism can be seen to be a barrier to becoming developmental. It is a barrier which has been seen to be a particular issue for African states.…”

Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Limits of Foreign Aid on Malawi’s Democratic Consolidation

“…The index ranges from 1-7, with higher scores indicating a worse environment for civil rights. In 1992, under Banda, Malawi's rating on the index was 7. million dollar private jet (Cammack and Kelsall 2011), no donors actually cut their assistance over this matter. There was speculation that given the sensitivity of the issue and Malawi's positive economic performance, donors would not intervene excessively (EIU 2010a).…”