Negative Returns to Status: The 2009 Expense Scandal and its impact on Parliamentary elites

Graffin, Scott D.; Bundy, Jonathan; Wade, James B.; Porac, Joseph F.; Quinn, Dennis P.

doi:10.5465/ambpp.2012.184

Cited by 61 publications

(108 citation statements)

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“…An individual director (e.g., alter) has high or low status (1) relative to other directors at large (i.e., reflecting the director's position in the status hierarchy of the corporate elite[Graffin et al, 2013]), and(2)relative to the focal director. An individual director (e.g., alter) has high or low status (1) relative to other directors at large (i.e., reflecting the director's position in the status hierarchy of the corporate elite[Graffin et al, 2013]), and(2)relative to the focal director.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Psyched-up to Suck-up: Self-regulated Cognition, Interpersonal Influence, and Recommendations for Board Appointments in the Corporate Elite

Westphal

Shani

2016

AMJ

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This study reveals how self-regulated cognition in advance of social interaction can resolve the so-called "ingratiator's dilemma" that the most attractive targets of social influence, those who have relatively high social status, tend to be the most difficult to ingratiate successfully. Our theoretical argument suggests that, in anticipation of social interaction with a relatively highstatus colleague, corporate directors tend to reflect on characteristics shared with that colleague, while avoiding thoughts about characteristics not shared. We explain how this pattern of cognition induces genuine positive feelings and admiration for the colleague, such that their interpersonal behaviors are less likely to appear as insincere attempts to curry favor, and thus more likely to engender influence. We further suggest that this pattern of cognition is especially valuable when interacting with relatively high-status colleagues who are demographically dissimilar from the focal actor. Finally, our theoretical framework indicates how this selfregulated cognition facilitates advancement in the corporate elite by positively moderating the effects of one's interpersonal behavior on the likelihood that colleagues will recommend him/her for a board appointment. We test our hypotheses with a unique dataset including survey data from a large sample of directors collected before and after meetings.

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confidence: 99%

Psyched-up to Suck-up: Self-regulated Cognition, Interpersonal Influence, and Recommendations for Board Appointments in the Corporate Elite

Westphal

Shani

2016

AMJ

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“…While there has been an extensive literature examining the role of celebrity CEOs and reputation (Graffin et al, 2013;Zavyalova, Pfarrer and Reger, 2017), our study expands this remit by demonstrating the role of other leaders such as partners, and how their regular interactions with clients and candidates is an important part of managing their own individual reputations as well as the reputations of their organizations, which also has wider implications for how the sector is perceived. While there has been an extensive literature examining the role of celebrity CEOs and reputation (Graffin et al, 2013;Zavyalova, Pfarrer and Reger, 2017), our study expands this remit by demonstrating the role of other leaders such as partners, and how their regular interactions with clients and candidates is an important part of managing their own individual reputations as well as the reputations of their organizations, which also has wider implications for how the sector is perceived.…”

Section: Moving Away From the Jonesesmentioning

confidence: 81%

“…While we are witnessing an era of declining public trust in firms (World Economic Forum, 2010), like many agents in a market, executive search firms rely on their professional reputation, buyerseller trust relations and market intelligence to secure new business in a highly competitive environment (Byrne, 1986;Finlay and Coverdill, 2002;Garrison-Jenn, 2005). There is an extensive 848 W. S. Harvey, J. V. Beaverstock and H. Li literature on reputation threats and crises (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996;Gioia, Schultz and Corley, 2000;Ravasi and Schultz, 2006;Rhee and Valdez, 2009) as well as important literature on the consequences of reputation damage (Fombrun, 2012;Graffin et al, 2013;Rindova et al, 2005). Research has also focused on how organizations respond to reputation challenges through impression management such as advertising and rebranding (Carter and Dukerich, 1998), which are considered 'superficial'; more 'substantial' responses (Rhee and Kim, 2012) that might involve centralizing control or selling assets are rarer.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Common Threats and Managing Reputation in Executive Search Firms

Harvey

Beaverstock

2018

British J of Management

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This paper provides important insights into how executive search firms can successfully manage their reputations to overcome major threats to their organizations. The paper focuses on three threats faced by executive search firms: the global financial crisis; questions around the sector's professional status; and the proliferation of social media for recruitment. Our data show that there was not a single coherent response from firms, but a piecemeal approach that focused on three forms of reputation management. First, diversifying service offerings; second, highlighting their symbolic capital; and third, connecting their firms to clients and candidates through partners. Building on our data and the theoretical literature, we provide a framework for understanding how professional service firms can manage their reputations in response to common threats, based on three categories from the English idiom 'keep up with the Joneses'. First, moving away from the Joneses; second, fencing out the Joneses; third, networking more than the Joneses. We provide theoretical and practical insights around how organizations can manage their reputations in response to threats which are common across sectors.

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“…On British parliamentarians creating rents for themselves, seeGraffin et al (2013). We refer here to political scandals that have no social virtue Holler and Wickström (1999).…”

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confidence: 98%

Where are the rent seekers?

Hillman

Ursprung

2016

Const Polit Econ

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In a remarkably simple and yet one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock pointed out that there are efficiency losses when public policies and political behavior create contestable rents. Tullock also observed that social losses from contesting rents appeared smaller than might be expected, so raising the question 'where are the rent seekers?' Tullock proposed that political accountability and 'free-riding' incentives in interest groups limit social losses from rent seeking. We affirm Tullock's explanations, which apply differently under different political institutions. We compare Tullock with Gary Becker, who focused on deadweight losses from redistribution and concluded, in contrast to Tullock, that political redistribution is efficient. The comparison with Becker highlights the significance of the recognition of Tullock's concept of rent seeking. By excluding rent-seeking losses from the social costs of redistribution, Becker could arrive at a conclusion more favorable than Tullock to an ideology that sees merit in extensive redistribution. Tullock's model, although more encompassing of actual social costs of redistribution, would have been less welcome in the social democratic welfare state.

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Negative Returns to Status: The 2009 Expense Scandal and its impact on Parliamentary elites

Cited by 61 publications

References 0 publications

Psyched-up to Suck-up: Self-regulated Cognition, Interpersonal Influence, and Recommendations for Board Appointments in the Corporate Elite

Psyched-up to Suck-up: Self-regulated Cognition, Interpersonal Influence, and Recommendations for Board Appointments in the Corporate Elite

Common Threats and Managing Reputation in Executive Search Firms

Where are the rent seekers?

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