Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory

Schrenk, Lawrence P.; Sorabji, Richard

doi:10.2307/4349600

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“…One reason for this might be that many philosophers arrive at branching time not via their views in the ontology of time, but rather because the branching time framework provides a convenient way of making sense other commitments they have. For example, according to some interpretations of Aristotle's celebrated discussion of future contingents in De Interpretatione 9, he arrives at the view that future contingents are neither true nor false in the course of trying to escape an argument in favor of logical determinism, the doctrine that if it will be that

p

, then it is necessary (unalterable) that it will be that

p

(Sorabji, 1980, Ch. 5).…”

Section: Two Kinds Of Branching Timementioning

confidence: 99%

Relativism and Two Kinds of Branching Time

Ninan

2022

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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p

, then it is necessary (unalterable) that it will be that

p

(Sorabji, 1980, Ch. 5).…”

Section: Two Kinds Of Branching Timementioning

confidence: 99%

Relativism and Two Kinds of Branching Time

Ninan

2022

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…See, for instance,Furley (1967) 194 and 65. For a compatibilist reading of this statement, seeEverson (1990) 96;Sorabji (1980) 233.…”

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Aristotle on Co-causes of One’s Dispositions

Grgić

2017

Elenchos

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In this paper I offer a close reading of Aristotle’s argument in the Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114a31–b25 and try to show that despite considerable interpretive difficulties, some clear structure can nevertheless be discerned. While Aristotle’s main concern in this passage is to refute the so-called asymmetry thesis – the thesis that virtue is voluntary, but vice is not – there is much more in it than just a dialectical encounter. Aristotle wants to respond to a more general objection, which has as its target the voluntariness of both virtue and vice, and which is provoked by some of his ideas in EN 3.4 and 3.5. Further, I will try to show why Aristotle thinks that we are only co-causes (sunaitioi) of our dispositions. In my opinion, his reasons have nothing to do with compatibilist or incompatibilist considerations as they are commonly understood in modern philosophy. In particular, he does not want to argue that nature (as well as social environment, early educators, etc.) is aitios of our dispositions just as ourselves are. Rather, we are co-causes of our dispositions because we are (efficient) causal origins of actions without which a certain good, which is the final cause of our actions and of our dispositions, cannot be achieved. Finally, I will try to show that Aristotle’s discussion implies that there is no more to the responsibility for dispositions than there is to the responsibility for actions.

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Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Relativism and Two Kinds of Branching Time

Relativism and Two Kinds of Branching Time

Aristotle on Co-causes of One’s Dispositions

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