2018
DOI: 10.1007/s10957-018-1251-3
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Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for Regular–Singular Stochastic Differential Games with Asymmetric Information

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Singular zero-sum differential games were extensively studied in the literature in both, undelayed and delayed dynamics, settings (see, e.g., [9,12,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25] and references therein). Singular Nash equilibrium differential games also were considered in the literature, but mostly in various stochastic settings (see, e.g., [15,26,27,28,29] and references therein).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Singular zero-sum differential games were extensively studied in the literature in both, undelayed and delayed dynamics, settings (see, e.g., [9,12,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25] and references therein). Singular Nash equilibrium differential games also were considered in the literature, but mostly in various stochastic settings (see, e.g., [15,26,27,28,29] and references therein).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The number of contributions on games of singular controls is still quite limited (see [19], [22], [26], [27], [36], [45], [51]), although these problems have received an increasing interest in the recent years. We briefly discuss here some of these works.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a problem has been motivated by a question arising in public economic theory. A general characterization of Nash equilibria through the Pontryagin Maximum Principle approach has been investigated in the recent [51] for regular-singular stochastic differential games. Connections between nonzero-sum games of singular control and games of optimal stopping have been tackled in [19].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%