Since the restoration of Timor-Leste's independence in 2002, accession to ASEAN has been the central preoccupation of Timor-Leste's foreign policy. Despite seemingly perpetual delays in accession, and the entrenched opposition of some ASEAN members, this position unites Timor-Leste's political parties, and rarely a note of dissent is heard. This fact alone makes it one of the fundaments of foreign policy. Others include a general policy of "friends to all", and, some would argue, a policy of balancing relationships between their two powerful neighbors to prevent the dominance of either one; and offsetting those bilateral relations with historical relationships with Portugal, and other countries like China (Leach & Percival-Wood, 2014).Indonesia remains the great sponsor of the ambition of ASEAN, and for this reason alone it is unlikely to be questioned by political elites in Timor-Leste; as it forms part of guarantee of good relations with their former occupier. Civil society is another matter altogether, however, and many critical perspectives on the advantages and disadvantages of accession have been noted by Timorese NGO s, such as Lao Hamutuk (2013), who have expressed concerns that ASEAN membership would impose costly obligations and increase Timor-Leste's already substantial import dependence (REF) further flooding its markets with cheap goods from ASEAN countries. Others have noted that the expectation of benefits are too high and will likely be restricted to elites (Kammen, 2013). Notably too, other members of ASEAN seem rather less enthusiastic about Timor-Leste's accession; with Singapore foremost among them. Confident predictions of accessions by certain dates have come and gone many times.In engaging with these issues and debates, this book represents a timely contribution to the literature, offering a wealth of insights into the many questions raised by Timor-Leste's relationship with ASEAN. Its deep engagement with these issues is welcomed. The centrality of ASEAN accession is undoubtable: the paradox lies partly in the fact that this orientation to ASEAN was not always so, nor perhaps as inevitable as it now appears.